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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last two decades, a new class of torts has emerged that
targets personal injuries caused by toxic substances in the environ-
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ment.1 These hybrid environmental torts are quite distinct from the
trespass-nuisance precedent that is part of traditional tort theory;2 nor
are environmental torts simply a subset of the mass hazardous sub-
stance litigation that has remade product liability law. Environmental
torts are informed, in a way product law is not, by environmental regu-
lation. These torts are unique because their deterrent signal is transmit-
ted to producers of hazardous environmental pollutants by litigants
who have suffered physical injury or disease.
Environmental tort litigation appears to be burgeoning. While com-
prehensive evidence on the number and average severity of environ-
mental tort claims nationwide is not available, published cases would
1. These cases include groundwater contamination, see, for example, Anderson v. Cryovac,
Inc., 862 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1988) (trichloroethylene (TCE) contamination of drinking water wells);
Backes v. The Valspar Corp., 783 F.2d 77 (7th Cir. 1986) (phenol contamination of wells); Renaud
v. Martin Marietta Corp., 749 F. Supp. 1545 (D. Colo. 1990), aff'd, 972 F.2d 304 (10th Cir. 1992)
(hydrazine contamination of groundwater); Werlein v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 887 (D. Minn.
1990), vacated, 793 F. Supp. 989 (D. Minn. 1992) (TCE contamination in groundwater); In re Paoli
R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 706 F. Supp 358 (E.D. Pa. 1988), rev'd, 916 F.2d 829 (3rd Cir. 1990)
(polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) contamination of groundwater); Merry v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 684 F. Supp. 847 (M.D. Pa. 1988) (toxic chemical contamination of wells); airborne contami-
nation, see, for example, Maddy v. Vulcan Materials Co., 737 F. Supp. 1528 (D. Kan. 1990) (air-
borne contaminants); Wells v. United States, 655 F. Supp. 715 (D.D.C. 1987), aff'd, 851 F.2d 1471
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (airborne emissions from lead manufacturing companies); exposure to pesticides,
see, for example, Villari v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 692 F. Supp. 568 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (pesticide con-
tamination of home); Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Tenn 1986),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988) (pesticide manufactur-
ing residues); exposure to radiation; see, for example, In re Consolidated Atmospheric Testing
Litigation, 616 F. Supp. 759 (N.D. Cal. 1985), aff'd sub nom., Konizeski v. Livermore Labs, 820
F.2d 982 (9th Cir. 1987) (nuclear test fallout); Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247 (D. Utah
1984), rev'd, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987) (nuclear test fallout); Code v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 778
F. Supp. 512 (D. Colo. 1991) (radioactive releases from a nuclear weapons plant); and exposures
combining these and other factors, see, for example, Elam v. Alcolac, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1988) (airborne and waterborne releases by chemical manufacturer); New Jersey Dep't of
Envtl. Protection v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150 (N.J. 1983) (releases from toxic waste dump); In
re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), af'd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir.
1987) (dioxin spraying in Vietnam); Vuocolo v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 573 A.2d 196 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (dioxin released due to explosion and gradual leakage).
2. Nuisance and trespass law bridge the gap between tort and property law. See generally
Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property Rights, 14 J.
Legal Stud. 13 (1985). The plaintiff-landowner in an action for nuisance or trespass alleges that
defendant's pollution invaded the landowner's property rights, not that it caused traumatic per-
sonal injury or disease. See, for example, Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y.
1970); Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Roles, and Fines as Land
Use Controls, 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 681 (1973). For a recent discussion of environmental-law theory
from a nuisance-trespass perspective, see Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls:
Management Strategies for Common Resources, 1991 Duke L. J. 1.
3. Hazardous substance litigation is a poorly defined term but often refers to mass product
liability cases. For some general discussions of the tremendous number of claims such products can
generate, see Marian S. Smith, Resolving Asbestos Claims: The Manville Personal Injury Settle-
ment Trust, 53 L. & Contemp. Probs. 27 (Autumn 1990); Kenneth R. Feinberg, The Dalkon
Shield Claimants Trust, 53 L. & Contemp. Probs. 79 (Autumn 1990).
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suggest both are at unprecedented high levels." Yet the topic is only
peripherally discussed in law reviews,5 and has not penetrated most law
school courses on tort law.6 The academic silence is perhaps under-
standable, since the subject of environmental torts tends to fall between
two relatively well-circumscribed disciplines, tort law and environmen-
tal law. Moreover, the teachers and theoreticians of both subject areas
are somewhat introspective at present. Over the past decade, the debate
over reforms that would retard the growth of certain kinds of tort
claims has preoccupied many tort law professors and some practition-
4. See cases cited in note 1. Environmental torts focusing on personal injury are a relatively
new legal species. The original and very high-profile environmental torts were based on the spray-
ing of pesticides in Vietnam, which gave rise to the Agent Orange litigation, see In re "Agent
Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); Peter H. Schuck, Agent Orange on
Trial (Harvard, 1986), and the exposure of individuals in rural Utah and Nevada to radioactive
fallout from atmospheric testing of nuclear devices by the federal government, see Allen v. United
States, 588 F. Supp. 247 (D. Utah 1984), rev'd, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987). A less publicized,
but perhaps more instructive situation concerns the DDT litigation in Triana, Alabama. See Fran-
cis E. McGovern, The Alabama DDT Settlement Fund, 53 L. & Contemp. Probs. 61 (Autumn
1990).
This precedent provides the basis for other environmental tort suits. Unfortunately, no infor-
mation is available on the number of these cases, although such publications as the Toxics Law
Reporter highlight new filings on a weekly basis. See, for example, Richmond Residents File Class
Action in Wake of Chevron Refinery Accident, 6 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 1117 (Feb. 19, 1992); Los
Alamos Lab Admits Waste Disposal, Denies Discharges Caused Residents' Cancer, 6 Toxics L.
Rep. (BNA) 1118 (Feb. 19, 1992). Many of these cases allege very severe money damages. See
Hodges v. Temple Inland, Inc., No. B142106 (Tex. Dist. Ct. Feb. 26, 1992) (complaint filed), cited
in 6 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 1259 (Mar. 18, 1992) (class action alleging $100 billion in damages
against 31 paper companies). Large suits have become especially prevalent around nuclear weap-
ons processing sites. See, for example, Cook v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 778 F. Supp. 512 (D. Col.
1991) (class action involving 60,000 plaintiffs in the area around Rocky Flats Weapon Plant in
central Colorado), cited in 6 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 835 (Dec. 11, 1991).
The average severity of these claims appears to be much higher than that of conventional or
even mass tort litigation. See Deborah R. Hensler, Trends in Tort Litigation: Findings from the
Institute for Civil Justice's Research, 48 Ohio St. L. J. 479 (1987) (setting forth the average sever-
ity for a variety of different classes of tort claims).
5. For example, in a recent article that summarizes a variety of alternatives for a "new
agenda" in environmental law, environmental torts are not mentioned. See Richard 0. Brooks, A
New Agenda for Modern Environmental Law, 6 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 1 (1991).
6. Most torts textbooks contain only limited sections on hazardous or abnormally dangerous
activities and nuisance. See, for example, Richard A. Epstein, Cases and Materials on Torts Ch. 7
at 548-605 (Little, Brown, 5th ed. 1990); David W. Robertson, et al., Cases and Materials on Torts
Ch. XIV at 684-703 (West, 1989); Page Keeton, et al., Cases and Materials on Tort and Accident
Law Ch. 16 at 572-635 (West, 2d ed. 1989).
While environmental textbooks often acknowledge the origins of modern pollution law in tres-
pass and nuisance, they rarely discuss toxic-related injuries that lead to tort litigation. See, for
example, John E. Bonine and Thomas 0. McGarity, The Law of Environmental Protection 237-49
(West, 1984). Some scholars, however, have grudgingly recognized the role of the common law in
deterring environmental pollution. See, for example, Roger W. Findley and Daniel A. Farber, Envi-
ronmental Law Cases and Materials 542-67 (West, 2d ed. 1985); Frederick R. Anderson, et al.,
Environmental Protection: Law and Policy 697-777 (Little, Brown, 2d ed. 1990).
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ers.7 Environmental law appears to be experiencing a severe mid-life
crisis, as academics struggle to redefine a subject that is increasingly
composed of stultifyingly technical statutes.8 The result of such distrac-
tions is that an exciting hybrid of personal injury and environmental
law has evolved without much analysis.
This essay develops a theory of environmental torts that has both
positive and normative aspects.' The positive theory describes why en-
vironmental tort litigation occurs. It emphasizes the economic gain, by
at least some of the participants, that drives the enterprise. In much of
tort law, environmental torts included, the critical economic players are
the plaintiffs' attorneys. If the compensation available through contin-
gency fees from personal injury suits is insufficient, attorneys will pur-
sue other kinds of cases. Hence, a positive theory of environmental torts
must explain how attorneys are able to gain compensation for their cli-
ents, and themselves.
7. The donnybrook over the recent American Law Institute's Reporter's Study provides an
excellent example. See Enterprise Liability for Personal Injury: Reporter's Study (ALI, 1991)
("Reporters' Study"). The Reporters' Study produced vigorous debate in the American Law Insti-
tute's subsequent general meetings. Many academics and practicing lawyers disagreed with its rel-
atively sweeping and, at times, radical recommendations. See, for example, Jerry Phillips,
Comments on the American Law Institute's Study of Enterprise Liability For Personal Injury
(1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). The American Law Institute now plans
to draft a restatement of product liability and the Reporter's Study apparently will serve only as a
background document. This debate reflects the ferment in tort doctrine and theory. Indeed, one
professor has characterized recent doctrinal changes in tort law as a "fundamental reordering" and
a "paradigm shift." See E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Defenses/Enforcing Standards: The Next
Stage of the Tort Revolution?, 43 Rutgers L. Rev. 1069, 1070 (1991).
8. See the comments by environmental law teachers in Joseph L. Sax, Environmental Law in
Law Schools: What We Teach and How We Feel About It, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,
251 (June 1989). In addition, environmental law is beset by the struggle between two rather mutu-
ally exclusive paradigms in environmental pollution: environmental ethics and market incentives.
Compare Christopher D. Stone, Earth and Other Ethics: The Case for Moral Pluralism (Harper &
Row, 2d ed. 1990) with Bruce A. Ackerman and Richard B. Stewart, Comment, Reforming Envi-
ronmental Law, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1333 (1985).
9. See, for example, Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 20-26 (Little, Brown, 3d
ed. 1986). The positive-normative distinction is often opaque, although scholars have strenuously
attempted to distinguish the two approaches. See, for example, Gregory Scott Crespi, The Mid-
Life Crisis of Law and Economics Movement: Confronting the Problems of NonFalsifiability and
Normative Bias, 67 Notre Dame L. Rev. 231, 237 (1991); Keith N. Hylton, Litigation Costs and
the Economic Theory of Tort Law, 46 U. Miami L. Rev. 111, 111 (1991) (noting that positive
theory justifies tort doctrine, while normative theory criticizes its operational efficiency). Webster's
New Collegiate Dictionary provides definitions that are reasonable for purposes of this Article.
"Normative" is the adjective form of "norm," which is defined as "a principle of right action bind-
ing upon the members of a group and serving to guide, control, or regulate proper and acceptable
behavior." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 806 (Merriam-Webster, 1987). "Positive" is
defined as "having or expressing actual existence ... logically affirmative . . . not speculative...
empirical." Id. at 918. A positive theory, therefore, explains what does happen in the real world,
while the normative theory explains the activity in terms of acceptable principles.
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A positive theory of environmental tort litigation is presently un-
available. Much of what has been written about toxic torts, and the
little that has addressed environmental torts, suggests that environmen-
tal tort suits should be rare because the cases are so difficult to win.10
The variety of scientific, evidentiary, and tort doctrinal issues would
appear to frustrate even the most committed plaintiffs' attorneys.1"
Therefore, the challenge for a positive theory of environmental torts is
to explain why and how lawyers are able to obtain fees in the face of
such obstacles.
The positive and normative theories are not coincident. For a nor-
mative theory of environmental torts, the critical concept is deter-
rence. 2 Just because a fee mechanism drives attorneys to bring tort
suits does not mean these suits will deter high-risk activities.13 Simi-
10. See especially Neil R. Komesar, Injuries and Institutions: Tort Reform, Tort Theory,
and Beyond, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 23 (1990); Clayton P. Gillette and James E. Krier, Risks, Courts,
and Agencies, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1027 (1990).
11. Tort claims for environmental injuries are paradigmatic of what Hensler has called "tier
three" torts-that is, mass torts with latent injuries. See Deborah Hensler, 48 Ohio St. L. J. at 483-
85 (cited in note 4). Injuries are latent in that the substances involved tend to be solvents or heavy
metals that cause subtle neurological or metabolic injuries, or carcinogens that have long incuba-
tion periods before the disease manifests itself. Thus, the problems with proving causation in toxic
tort litigation, and with the unpredictability of outcome that attends such problems, are exagger-
ated in environmental injury tort claims. Unlike product-based mass tort litigation, those injured
by environmental toxins may be unaware of their exposure. Typically, toxins are dispersed in
water or air and do not leave definite footprints to prove their presence. Finally, if injured persons
become aware of such exposure and the causal connection between the exposure and their injury
years after the latency period has expired, they may find litigation hampered by statute-of-limita-
tions restrictions. See Michael D. Green, The Paradox of Statutes of Limitations in Toxic Sub-
stances Litigation, 76 Cal. L. Rev. 965 (1988). In combination, issues of exposure, causation, and
latency periods make environmental torts extraordinarily burdensome.
12. The focus on the positive side reflects a realistic economic appraisal of tort litigation. On
the normative side, rationalizations for tort law centers on deterrence, compensation, and correc-
tive justice. Deterrence is the primary normative reason for the resistance of tort law. See, for
example, Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis 68 (Yale,
1970).
Compensation has less merit as a normative rationale for torts. Social insurance can compen-
sate injured individuals much more efficiently. See George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis
and Modern Tort Law, 96 Yale L. J. 1521, 1550-56 (1987). Moreover, tort suits may provide inac-
curate compensation. For example, while many people are negligently injured in hospitals, less
than two percent file claims for damages. See A. Russell Localio, et al., Relation Between Malprac-
tice Claims and Adverse Events Due to Negligence: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice
Study III, 325 New Eng. J. Med. 245, 246-47 (1991). While economic losses are quite high, com-
pensation is generally unavailable through torts. See William G. Johnson, et al., The Economic
Consequences of Medical Injuries, 267 JAMA 2487, 2488 (1992) (discussing costs of medical
injuries).
Corrective justice is discussed in more detail at text accompanying notes 228-29.
13. For instance, in New York in 1984 several hundred million dollars in fees fueled over
3600 claims, but this produced little evidence of deterrence. See Troyen A. Brennan, An Empirical
Analysis of Accidents and Accident Law, 36 S.L.U. L. J. 823, 864 (forthcoming 1992-93). Although
rarely discussed, tort litigation could be a social phenomenon that serves little purpose other than
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larly, while there may be many normative reasons that recommend en-
vironmental tort litigation as an effective deterrent, doctrinal or
evidentiary issues may yet frustrate successful suits. In the latter situa-
tion, a normative theory might recommend law reform that increases
economic incentives for attorneys to bring environmental tort claims.
Unlike a positive theory, a normative theory is not neutral. Based
on an assessment of the incentives that litigation produces, the norma-
tive theory should recommend either more or less environmental tort
litigation. With regard to environmental torts, that recommendation
likely will remain tentative. While scholars have considered the theoret-
ical deterrence effect of torts suits, 14 they have provided startlingly lit-
tle evidence that common-law litigation actually prevents injuries in an
efficacious manner.15 From a policy perspective, then, one encourages or
discourages any type of tort litigation with great caution and little con-
fidence. Environmental torts are no exception.
Empirical evidence suggests that environmental torts suits cur-
rently send a weak deterrent signal. Consider the evidence available
concerning the optimal level of environmental tort litigation from a de-
terrence perspective. Scientists estimate that environmental carcino-
gens cause at least 10,000 deaths annually in the United States. 6 Also,
haphazardly compensating a few people, whether or not injured, and enriching plaintiffs' attor-
neys. This possibility renders the segregation of positive and normative theories critical.
14. Some of the best functional analyses of common-law litigation center on nuisance and
trespass. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165 (1967); Frank I. Michelman,
Pollution as a Tort: A Non-Accidental Perspective on Calabresi's Costs, 80 Yale L. J. 647 (1971)
(book review); Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972). For more recent theoreti-
cal analyses of the incentives produced by litigation in the environmental area, see Lewis A. Korn-
hauser and Richard L. Revesz, Sharing Damages Among Multiple Tortfeasors, 98 Yale L. Rev.
831 (1989); Lewis A. Kornhauser and Richard L. Revesz, Apportioning Damages Among Poten-
tially Insolvent Actors, 19 J. Legal Stud. 617 (1990).
15. See I Reporters' Study, Ch. 14 (cited in note 7).
16. See Richard Doll and Richard Peto, The Causes of Cancer: Quantitative Estimates of
Avoidable Risks of Cancer in the United States Today, 66 J. Nat'l Cancer Inst. 1191 (1981). Doll
and Peto identified 11 known avoidable causes of cancer: tobacco, alcohol, diet, food additives,
reproductive and sexual behavior, occupation, pollution, industrial products, medicines and medi-
cal procedures, geophysical factors, and infection. Id. at 1220-55. Tobacco, alcohol, diet, food addi-
tives, reproductive behavior, and occupation are readily distinguished from environmental factors.
Within the category of pollution, Doll and Peto included atmospheric air pollution, drinking water
toxins, and the contamination of food by industrial products like heavy metals and pesticide resi-
dues. Environmental toxins accounted for two percent of cancer deaths. In 1988, an estimated
488,000 people died of cancer in the United States, up from 330,000 in 1970. See Bureau of the
Census, U.S. Dep't of Comm., Statistical Abstract of the United States 79 (1990).
These estimates appear to be conservative for several reasons. First, Doll and Peto's estimates
of the particular contributions of certain kinds of toxins are lower than those of other, perhaps as
highly regarded, estimates. For instance, Doll and Peto studied the occupational carcinogen asbes-
tos and concluded that in 1975 asbestos led to 500 to 600 deaths from mesothelioma. See Doll and
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statistics from 1985-86 indicate that defendants spent a total of $200
million per year on environmental tort litigation, including litigation
costs, jury verdicts and settlements. 7 Therefore, each cancer death
costs defendants $20,000.18 In the only other area of tort law where sim-
ilar figures are readily available, medical malpractice, litigation is esti-
mated to cost defendants $143,000 per death.19 The environmental
litigation deterrence signal is, therefore, relatively weak.
Of course, tort litigation's deterrence effect depends not just on its
economic magnitude, but also on the ability of polluters to understand
and assess the economic signal. Careful consideration of the circum-
stances of environmental tort litigants, and of the nature of tort doc-
trine, might suggest peculiarities that would render the deterrent signal
incomprehensible to environmental tort defendants. Nonetheless, the
foregoing rudimentary calculations do not provide sufficient basis to
conclude that there is too much environmental tort litigation. There-
fore, the appropriate normative perspective must be open-minded to-
ward increasing environmental tort litigation, while exploring the
nuances of deterrence dynamics.20
Peto, 66 J. Natl Cancer Inst. at 1308. Selikoff's more careful estimate is that 1100 to 1500 deaths
were due to mesothelioma in the mid-1970s. See William J. Nicholson, et al., Occupational Expo-
sure to Asbestos: Population at Risk and Projected Mortality, 3 Amer. J. Indus. Med. 259, 301
(1982). Second, Doll and Peto did not anticipate the amount of cancer morbidity and mortality
that is now associated with indoor radon air pollution and with the depletion of stratospheric
ozone resulting from chlorofluorocarbon pollution. EPA now attributes as many as 30,000 cancer
deaths per year to these two factors. Environmental Protection Agency, Unfinished Business: A
Comparative Assessment of Environmental Problems 28-29 (U.S. Dep't of Comm., 1987) ("Unfin-
ished Business").
EPA's 1987 estimate of cancer mortality caused by a restricted list of environmental toxins is
also greater than 10,000. In particular, Unfinished Business relates that (i) pesticides on food
caused more than 6000 deaths; (ii) indoor air pollutants (excluding tobacco smoke and radon)
caused more than 1000 deaths; (iii) exposure to chemicals in the environment and toxic air pollu-
tion caused 2000 deaths; (iv) inactive waste sites led to 1000 deaths; (v) drinking water contamina-
tion caused 400 to 1000 cancer deaths each year; and (vi) a combination of other sources result in
another 1000 deaths. Id. at 28-31.
17. Peter Huber estimates settlements and jury verdicts at under $200 million for the years
1985 and 1986. See Peter Huber, Environmental Hazards and Liability Law, in Robert E. Litan
and Clifford Winston, eds., Liability: Perspectives and Policy 136 (Brookings Inst., 1988). If jury
verdicts and settlements are worth $100 million per year, and the administrative costs of complex
tort litigation are equal to this amount, see Hensler, 48 Ohio St. L. J. at 492 (cited in note 4), the
total litigation costs for defendants are at most $200 million per year.
18. Carcinogens are not the only types of environmental health hazards, but in some ways
they are the easiest to measure in terms of adverse health effect.
19. See Brennan, 36 S.L.U. L. J. at 832, 856 (cited in note 13) (stating that 7000 negligent
deaths in New York hospitals in 1984 produced $1 billion in tort costs). This amount of litigation
provides little evidence of deterrence. See Troyen A. Brennan, Improving the Quality of Medical
Care 10 Yale L. & Policy Rev. 431, 434-38 (forthcoming 1992).
20. The proposition of deterrence through torts can be questioned if one doubts the rational-
ity of human behavior. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Rationality in Law and Economics, 60 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 293-96 (1992). This insight is especially salient when discussing safety signals. See
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A critical first step in the development of normative and positive
theories of environmental torts is to examine the notion of environmen-
tal harm. Torts may target only a subset of the environmental risks
that are addressed by environmental law generally. One reason that en-
vironmental law seems to be in a state of flux is that the various risks
now addressed by environmental law are quite heterogeneous, while the
standard assumption in much of the literature is that environmental
pollution is homogenous. Accordingly, Part II of this Article decon-
structs environmental pollution and identifies the subset of pollution
paradigms, centering on illnesses caused by toxic substances, that per-
sonal injury litigation can profitably address.
The next step is to consider the alternatives to environmental torts
that deter these environmental injuries. Part III suggests that tradi-
tional environmental regulation has addressed certain environmental
pollution paradigms without much success. Positively, the failure of
regulation may explain the persistence of perceived injuries that pro-
vide the basis for suits. Normatively, environmental torts may be best
characterized as alternative devices for deterrence of environmental in-
jury, again arising because of the failure of conventional regulation.
Part IV discusses how other institutional approaches-the market and
criminal law-also fail to deter certain types of environmental injury.
Having suggested that tort law can reasonably deter certain para-
digms of environmental injury that other institutions fail to address,
Part V outlines the distinctive aspects of environmental tort litigation.
Part V shows how judges have reduced some of the obdurate barriers in
traditional personal injury law to help plaintiffs' attorneys bring suc-
cessful environmental tort claims, thereby providing a positive theory of
environmental torts. Part V also examines the efficiency of the deter-
rence produced by evolving environmental tort litigation.21
II. PARADIGMS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION
Before defining the role of environmental torts, a discussion of the
concept of environmental injury is necessary. Environmentalism has
had a strong attachment to a unitary paradigm of industrial pollution.
The chief paradigm for environmental law seems to be one in which
sources of industrial pollution foul the local air or river in a manner
that is of great nuisance value, but only mildly harmful to human
health. This model gave rise to the Clean Air Act in 1970 and Federal
Richard G. Noll and James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk Regula-
tion, 19 J. Legal Stud. 747 (1990). Hence, any normative conclusion herein must remain quite
tentative.
21. See Elliott, 43 Rutgers L. Rev. at 1077 (cited in note 7).
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Water Pollution Control Act in 1972.22
Recognition of other paradigms of pollution led to a variety of ad-
ditions to these venerable statutes, and to the enactment of a bewilder-
ing array of others. In addition, another stream of environmentalism
focused on protection of the natural environment.24 Yet, an institu-
tional analysis of environmental law from the viewpoint of the hetero-
geneity of the problems it targets has not been developed. One sort of
environmental injury may be quite different from another and, hence,
may call for unique institutional reponses. Formulating a matrix of en-
vironmental pollution paradigms is critical to understanding the role of
environmental torts.
The taxonomy of environmental paradigms should begin with the
division of natural beauty protection from human health protection.
This distinction, recently recognized by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA),25 separates the ecological impulses of environmentalism
from those that sound in public health. For example, the Endangered
Species Act in no way intends to enhance human health; rather, it val-
ues biological diversity and preventing the degradation of nature. Envi-
ronmental ethics, and the impressive naturalist-philosophical baggage
associated with it, is concerned mainly with this spotted-owl paradigm
of environmentalism.2 ' Environmental tort law is not targeted at
threats to ecological diversity, although certain kinds of public nuisance
litigation may be.17 Personal injury litigation of the sort discussed in
this Article alleges harm to human health. Of course, much of environ-
mental law shares the same goals, and specifically aims to deter the
same activities, so that targeting human health may have the indirect
consequence of preserving purely ecological concerns.
A second major set of bipolar categories involves the geographical
relationship between source and environment. Pollution is either dis-
22. The Clean Air Act was based on setting permissible exposure limits, while the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act relied primarily on a permitting system. See Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7671(q) (West 1983 & Supp. 1992); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988). See also William H. Rodgers, Environmental Law Treatise § 3.1 at
182 (West, 1986).
23. See Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-2671 (West 1982 & Supp. 1992)
(creating a licensing system for the marketing of toxic substances); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 300(f)-300(j)(26) (1988) (setting tolerances for drinking water); Solid Waste Disposal Act,
42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6992(k) (West 1983 & Supp. 1992) (setting guidelines for hazardous waste
management).
24. See, for example, Mark Sagoff, The Economy of the Earth: Philosophy, Law, and the
Environment (Cambridge, 1988).
25. See Unfinished Business at 8-20 (cited in note 16) (discussing differences of ecological
and public health aspects of environmental law).
26. See generally Erin Pitts, The ESA and the Spotted Owl, 21 Envtl. L. 1175 (1991).
27. See Rose, 1991 Duke L. J. at 11-20 (cited in note 2).
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persed from, or concentrated at, a site. Industries build tall stacks, and
dump into fast flowing streams in order to disperse pollution over a
broad area, and decrease exposure. See Figure la.
Figure la
Dispersed Risk Distribution
z = (1.25/2-x) e -"' x 2+ Y2)
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Other forms of pollution, such as that of ground water or soil at hazard-
ous waste sites, tend to be concentrated, with higher exposures in a lim-
ited area. See Figure lb.
Figure lb
Concentrated Risk Distribution
z - e7"y '
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Still others may have more complicated risk patterns due to ground
water flow mechanics or prevailing winds. See Figure 1c.
Figure 1c
Risk Distribution
z = .fx e ,fy e7
These geographic and climatological issues contribute to the configura-
tion of a risk envelope: the spatial distribution of risk from environmen-
tal toxins. Environmental regulation has long recognized this
distinction: much of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act assumes
dispersed pollution, while the Safe Drinking Water Act and Superfund
presume concentrated pollution.
The third generic distinction that characterizes environmental par-
adigms concerns the multiplicity of the sources. The number of sources
of pollution sometimes determines environmental regulatory strategies.
Some regulations Control pollution from a plant that burns solid wastes
in an isolated area. s Other regulations attempt to minimize pollution
from the exhaust of millions of automobiles that crowd cities every
morning.29 While the pollution from each might be controlled through
the same generic response-point source controls such as catalytic con-
28. 42 U.S.C. § 7429 (West Supp. 1992) (Clean Air Act).
29. Id. § 7521.
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verters for cars and scrubbers for smelters-they are usually considered
different environmental paradigms and usually call for different control
strategies.
Combining the latter two types of generic distinctions enables us to
construct a set of unique environmental paradigms. Four are possible,
as shown in Table 1.
Table 1
Multiplicity of Sites
Single
Concentrated
Geographic
Distribution
Dispersion
Numerous
A set of examples restricted to the air medium might be A: an isolated
smelter in a valley given to temperature inversion, which creates baro-
metric pressure that keeps the pollution from dispersing, as an example
of the concentrated, singular-source paradigm; B: a similar smelter on a
plain with strong and constant prevailing winds for the dispersed, sin-
gular-source paradigm; C: automobile pollution in a city given to tem-
perature inversions for numerous, concentrated pollution; and D:
similar pollution in a city with strong prevailing winds for the numer-
ous, dispersed-source paradigms.30
30. This is obviously not the only way to characterize pollution scenarios. It is, rather, a
device for illustrating some important points about the kinds of environmental problems for which
torts might be a useful source of deterrence.
A C
B D
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A final set of distinctions concerns toxicity. The major environmen-
tal statutes typically contain particular segments that address toxic
substances. For instance the Clean Air Act includes Section 112, which
was intended to abate toxic air pollutants, while much of the rest of the
Act dealt with "criteria" air pollutants, which, presumably, are not
toxic.31 Unfortunately, the Act has not distinguished toxic and nontoxic
pollutants clearly. Most air pollution affects human health. Regulators
selected many of the criteria pollutants for special attention because
they contributed to "killer smogs" in the 1940s and 1950s. Yet they did
not label these pollutants "toxic." Regulators presumed that toxic air
pollutants, usually carcinogens, were more deadly or poisonous.2 But
Congress, regulators, and the courts curiously have not developed
brightline distinctions between toxic substances and other forms of pol-
lution, and instead typically rely on lists of toxic substances, treating
the distinction as if it were self-evident.
Two somewhat legal, somewhat scientific notions seem to be inte-
grated into this toxic-nontoxic dichotomy. The first is potency, or the
power to cause disease or death after exposure to small amounts. For
instance, regulators long considered dioxin an extraordinarily toxic sub-
stance because it killed laboratory animals after exposure to minute
doses. On the other hand, they have never characterized carbon monox-
ide as toxic, even though it too can kill laboratory animals. Part of the
reason is that carbon monoxide must be present in rather high concen-
trations to be lethal. The second factor in determining toxicity is signa-
ture status, to use a term popularized by lawyers. Signature diseases are
31. Clean Air Act § 112, Pub. L. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1690, codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §
7412 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992).
32. The definition of hazardous air pollutant under the old Section 112 of the Clean Air Act
was as follows:
[T]he term "hazardous air pollutant" means an air pollutant to which no ambient air quality
standard is applicable and which in the judgment of the Administrator causes, or contributes
to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to result in an increase in mortality, or
an increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness.
42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1) (1988). Interestingly, the new Section 112 provided by the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990 eschews the generic definition of hazardous pollutant and instead provides
an initial list of over 200 chemicals that Congress considers toxic. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(b)(1) (West
Supp. 1992). Further additions to this list are planned. See text accompanying notes 89-99.
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those that are rare in the absence of certain kinds of exposures.3 3 For
instance, doctors thought that vaginal adenocarcinoma of the cervix was
a rare condition except in women exposed to diethylstilbestrol (DES) in
utero. It was, therefore, a signature disease for DES.
A more technical way to characterize signature status is to refer to
the epidemiological notion of attributable fraction (or risk) of disease.34
When a particular disease is highly associated with a certain kind of
substance, the attributable fraction of disease is said to be high. For
instance, the fraction of mesothelioma attributable to asbestos exposure
is well over ninety percent, that is, more than nine out of ten deaths
from mesothelioma are the result of asbestos exposure. On the other
hand, we know that criteria air pollutants, like sulfur dioxide, are asso-
ciated with an increased risk of death from pneumonia, but the attribu-
table fraction of such deaths to sulfur dioxide, even in a very polluted
area, is less than five percent. Therefore, mesothelioma is a signature
disease of asbestos (a toxic substance) whereas pneumonia is not a sig-
nature disease of sulfur dioxide (not a toxic substance).
Potency and signature status combine to determine regulatory no-
tions of toxicity; regulators may label a substance toxic even if it does
not cause a high attributable fraction of disease, so long as it is very
potent, like dioxin. On the other hand, they may consider toxic a sub-
stance, like DES, that causes a signature disease, even if people must
ingest it in relatively high doses to cause any harm. Figure 2 illustrates
this point. I am aware of no toxic substances that are not potent and do
not cause a high attributable fraction of disease in an exposed popula-
33. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Individual Action and Collective Responsibility: The Di-
lemma of Mass Tort Reform, 73 Va. L. Rev. 845-67 (1987) (discussing the notion of signature
diseases).
34. See Troyen A. Brennan and Robert F. Carter, Legal and Scientific Probability of Causa-
tion of Cancer and Other Environmental Diseases in Individuals, 10 J. Health Pol., Pol'y & L. 33,
50 (1985) (discussing the notion of attributable fraction). Toxicologists rely to a large extent on
statistical definitions of morbidity and mortality. Statistics based on epidemiological observations
can tell toxicologists that a substance is highly associated with a variety of disease states. See
Troyen A. Brennan, Causal Chains and Statistical Links: The Role of Scientific Uncertainty in
Hazardous Substance Litigation, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 469, 482 (1988) (discussing epidemiology as it
applies to hazardous substance litigation). For instance, cadmium is associated with renal impair-
ment and lung cancer. Conversely, the same sort of data reveals that certain diseases are especially
prone to environmental influences. For example, exposure to cadmium, a variety of heavy metals,
or asbestos can cause lung cancer.
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tion. Note that the division between toxic and nontoxic is not sharply
defined in Figure 2: a substantial grey zone exists between these
categories.
Figure 2
Toxicity as a Function of Potency and
Attributable Fraction
Non '  : ,Toxic
Potency
Nontoxic
Attributable Fraction
Each of the four paradigms based on geographic dispersion and
multiplicity of sources fissions when we incorporate the toxic-nontoxic
distinction. For instance, a singular coal-fired utility plant may emit
primarily criteria (nontoxic) pollutants onto a plain with strong prevail-
ing winds, or a singular smelter may emit toxic, heavy metal pollutants.
Each of the resulting eight paradigms suggests a different toxic risk en-
velope. Applying the ecological-human health distinction to this matrix
adds four additional paradigms. For example, sulfur dioxide, which
causes acid rain, is primarily an ecological, dispersed, numerous-source-
type of pollutant.
This set of paradigms is certainly not the only way to categorize
environmental pollution. It is intended for the particular purpose of de-
veloping an understanding of the emergence and social utility of envi-
ronmental torts. Even in the absence of this narrow purpose, one can
appreciate that different pollution paradigms could give rise to different
control strategies. Each of the twelve environmental pollution para-
digms presents it own problems. Concentrated, toxic, single-source pol-
lution such as groundwater contamination calls for different measures
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than does dispersed, toxic, single-source pollution, such as emissions
from a smelter on a plain with strong prevailing winds. And both differ
from numerous-source, dispersed, toxic pollution such as chlorofluoro-
carbons (CFCs), which may, at present, pose our most serious environ-
mental threat.3 5
The heterogeneity of environmental paradigms has been insuffi-
ciently appreciated in environmental law. For purposes of this Article,
its absence from discussions of torts caused by hazardous substances is
our major concern. For instance, both Professor Neil Komesar's sophis-
ticated analysis of the institutional role of tort law,36 and the seminal
evaluation of legal approaches to abatement of risks by Professors Clay-
ton Gillette and James Krier37 rely on rather unsophisticated, unitary
notions of environmental pollution. Both papers conclude that environ-
mental tort law has little potential as a source for plaintiffs' attorneys
fees and little merit as a deterrence-producing institution. 8 A brief
overview of their arguments helps illustrate the importance of consider-
ing the heterogeneity of environmental paradigms, especially if one is to
explain the emergence of environmental torts (positive theory), and as-
sess its deterrence value (normative theory).
Komesar insightfully considers not only the post-injury behavior of
injurers and injured, but also their pre-injury actions. He sheds light on
the important subject of the ability of institutional actors to develop or
react to deterrence signals.3 9 He characterizes victims of air and water
pollution as having low ex ante expectations of injury, and notes that
these injuries have a low per capita impact because of their diffuse na-
ture. On .the other hand, the injurer expects ex ante that pollution
could have serious repercussions, and after injury has occurred, recog-
nizes the potentially severe losses.
35. CFC pollution depletes the stratospheric ozone and, as a result, allows more ionizing ra-
diation to strike the surface of the earth. This appears to be causing a huge increase in the inci-
dence of melanoma or skin cancer. The EPA estimates that as many as 15,000 additional deaths of
melanoma per year occur as a result of this stratospheric ozone depletion. See Unfinished Business
at 18 (cited in note 16). CFC pollution is the result of multiple use of spray cans and refrigerators.
It is dispersed because there is wide geographic incidence of the use of these products. It is toxic
because it causes so much melanoma. Indeed much of the 30% to 40% rise in incidence of mela-
noma can be attributed to CFCs. Id. at 20.
36. Komesar, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 23 (cited in note 10).
37. Gillette and Krier, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1027 (cited in note 10).
38. One must conclude, after studying these analyses, that tort law serves little compensation
or deterrent purposes in cases of environmental pollution. Indeed, accounting for the phenomenon
at all, given these persuasive arguments, is quite difficult. The central propositions of this Article
are that these analysts miss some points, particularly that the evolution of environmental torts is
rational from the viewpoint of the economic interest of plaintiff attorneys, and is likely from a
deterrence perspective.
39. See Komesar, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 33.
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Underlying Komesar's analysis is the paradigm of environmental
pollution as nontoxic, dispersed, and originating from a singular source.
The singular source would have high stakes in the pollution, both
before and after injury; the injured individuals would have low stakes.
The pollution is not potent, causes a very low percentage of the diseases
with which it is associated, and is dispersed over a wide geographic
area. It does not create incentives for action on the part of the injured.
As Komesar suggests, this situation rarely would give rise to an environ-
mental tort or to attorneys' fees.4 °
Other paradigms of environmental injury exist, however. If we
change the above paradigm to one in which numerous sources, such as
automobiles, produce pollution, the institutional distribution shifts in a
way that Komesar has not anticipated. To use Komesar's vernacular
environmental pollution has an actual and potential low impact for vic-
tims and also potential low impact for injurers (the automobile driv-
ers).41 Since automobiles are numerous and each contributes only small
amounts to the total injury burden, automobile drivers are poor recipi-
ents of deterrence signals.
Consider now the paradigm of the singular, concentrated, toxic pol-
luter. This seems to resemble Komesar's "Distribution #2, ''42 which in-
volves potential and actual high impact for the polluter (injurer) and
actual high impact for the victim. In this situation, a toxic substance
that causes a signature-type disease and that is emitted in a concen-
trated fashion from a singular source, creates the appropriate situation
for tort actions by injured individuals. These tort actions inform highly
deterrable producers of the situation. Komesar himself would encourage
tort litigation in such situations because of its deterrent effect. Plain-
tiffs' attorneys also find these situations attractive. All of this under-
lines the fact that some environmental injury paradigms lend
themselves to institutional responses such as tort litigation that are in-
appropriate or inapplicable for other paradigms. Abandoning the uni-
tary concept of pollution makes this fact easily recognizable.
Overcoming the notion that environmental pollution only creates
vague, diffuse risk allows one to understand how environmental tort lit-
igation can succeed. Consider Gillette and Krier's argument that com-
mon-law litigation cannot produce deterrence for any public risks,
including those posed by environmental hazards, largely because of fun-
damental "access" bias against plaintiffs.4 3 Access bias results from liti-
40. Id. at 48-50 (Distribution #3).
41. Id. at 30-33 (I am applying Komesars language here myself; he does not describe this
type of distribution).
42. Id. at 38-40.
43. See Gillette and Krier, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1045 (cited in note 10). Gillette and Krier
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gants deciding that these suits are not worthwhile. They base these
decisions on an understanding that public risks are "diffuse in their im-
pacts, and of low probability."' 44 Obviously, Gillette and Krier have in
mind the environmental paradigm of diffuse, nontoxic pollution that
carries a low attributable fraction. They fail to consider that public risk,
at least the environmental sort, comes in different packages. (Gillette
and Krier may respond that they would not call toxic, concentrated pol-
lution a public risk at all, but they seemingly intend to apply their anal-
ysis to all forms of hazardous substance litigation, including
environmental torts.)
While both Komesar, and Gillette and Krier, may be too simplistic
in their discussion of environmental injuries, their analyses demonstrate
that courts will not readily apply tort law to nontoxic injury. These au-
thors' concerns about "diffuseness," "low impact" on plaintiffs, and
"low probability," are appropriate when substances are not potent, and
when they possess a low attributable fraction of disease. It is thus diffi-
cult to explain how environmental torts occur, or to advocate the deter-
rence that they may produce for anything other than toxic injury.
Therefore, from here forward, I will restrict the analysis to torts for
toxic environmental pollution.45
We thus shift our attention primarily to the four paradigms of
toxic pollution. The single-source-multiple-source and concentrated-
dispersed dichotomies are, of course, simplifications. Each dichotomy
really represents a spectrum of sources of pollution. For example, some
cases will concern a truly singular pollution source, such as an isolated
smelter. Moving along the spectrum toward multiplicity of sources is
the case of several paper mills polluting the same river. Next are the
numerous oil refineries and steel mills in an industrialized setting that
contribute to benzene air pollution. At the far of the spectrum lies the
cases involving a near infinite number of pollution sources, for instance
the innumerable spray cans and leaking refrigeration units that emit
CFCs, which deplete the ozone layer.
While regulations address the spectrum of such pollution, torts
cannot. At some point, the number of potential defendants tends to
overwhelm the ability of plaintiffs to join them.46 There is a poorly
also mention the concept of process bias, an issue I return to in Part V.
44. Id. at 1046.
45. This is the area where one would expect the lions' share of the action in any case.
46. See text accompanying notes 140-44.
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specified threshold beyond
practicable. See Figure 3.
which common-law litigation is simply im-
Figure 3
Smelter
Paper Mills
on one River
Singular
Refineries
and Steel Mills
in one city
Chlorofluorocarbons
Pollution
tort threshold
Thus, when there are a near infinite number of pollution sources, regu-
lation is the only answer, and we need not question its efficacy in this
Article. For example, I will forego analysis of regulations for CFC con-
trol or toxic pollutants from motor vehicles."'
The same sort of limits apply to the concentrated-dispersed dichot-
omy. See Figure 4.
Figure 4
Nuclear Waste
in Salt Mine
Groundwater
Pollution
Concentrated
Surface Water
Pollution
Dispersed Air
Pollution
tort threshold
I
Dispersed
The most concentrated pollution might be exemplified by nuclear
wastes encapsulated in geologically stable salt mines. An example of
somewhat less concentrated pollution is groundwater contamination in
an aquifer with slow subterranean movement. Moving toward more dis-
persion is the example of surface water pollution in a bay. Air pollution
in an area with strong prevailing winds is an example of very dispersed
pollution. The latter pollution scenario challenges the limits of mass
47. See 40 C.F.R. § 85 (1974), promulgated in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (1988)
(Clean Air Act § 202(a)).
Multiple
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tort litigation as the plaintiff class grows in size and geographic disper-
sion. Therefore, successful tort litigation will center on concentrated,
singular environmental paradigms. These paradigms also escape many
of the normative concerns raised by Komesar, and Gillette and Krier: in
such cases, a court can aggregate a defined set of plaintiffs in an action
against a single producer. These plaintiffs can focus on the particular
features of the pollution.
The other insight gleaned from the Komesar, and Gillette and
Krier papers is the importance of an institutional perspective to evalu-
ating the deterrence of injuries. Indeed, if other institutional devices,
such as the market, regulation or criminal law, would deter toxic pollu-
tion effectively, this would bear importantly on our analysis of environ-
mental tort litigation. If any of these alternatives were capable of
dealing with all the various toxic pollution paradigms, discussion of en-
vironmental torts would be unnecessary. Therefore, we should digress
from tort law to evaluate the other institutional means to deter hazard-
ous pollution-related injuries, while continuing to use the analytical de-
vice of environmental paradigms.
III. REGULATION AND RESIDUAL RISK
Over the last twenty-five years, individuals and institutions have
devoted massive amounts of political will and intellectual effort to regu-
lating pollution, including toxic pollution. If this effort had been suc-
cessful in reducing risks of toxic injury to minimal levels, or offered the
promise of such reduction in the near future, then a positive theorist
would have to ask why environmental torts have emerged. If no or little
residual risks remained, then it seems unlikely that plaintiffs would
seek attorneys, and less likely that attorneys would take cases. Hence,
the existence of tort litigation over environmental toxins suggests the
environmental regulation scheme is incomplete.
Of course, litigation may concern pollution that occurred before the
regulation regime was in place. The latency period that characterizes
many environmental illnesses can be as long as twenty years. Conceiva-
bly, today's environmental tort litigation slowly will vanish as those af-
flicted by diseases caused by toxic pollution of ten to twenty years ago
die. Therefore, environmental regulation may work, and yet attorneys
are still motivated to bring suit.
While the effectiveness of the regulation may therefore be periph-
eral to understanding the positive concern of why environmental torts
are brought, it remains important on the normative side. If regulation
has reduced risk, there is little need for the deterrence function of torts.
Tort litigation, especially in the environmental areas, has large adminis-
trative costs that can only be justified if it fulfills a deterrent function.
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That function is likely to be very thin if regulation of toxins is robust.
Therefore, any recommendation for more or less environmental tort liti-
gation will depend on an institutional analysis of the regulation of envi-
ronmental toxins.
Most environmental regulations do recognize a toxic-nontoxic di-
chotomy, and so we can concentrate efforts on the former.48 The major
environmental statutes are also media-specific. Toxic control methodol-
ogies have varied somewhat between statutes, 49 but most initially re-
flected the optimism that characterized environmental statutes
generally. The Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act, for example,
ambitiously addressed many sources of toxic injury. Congress did not,
however, elaborate specific regulatory mechanisms. It left much of the
specifics to the agencies, who were to use notice-and-comment rulemak-
ing to develop the concrete rules for citizen and corporate behavior.
The statutes of the early 1970s, and the control strategies to which
they gave rise, were perhaps destined to fall short. 0 Acute observers of
regulation had long voiced concerns that "comprehensively rational"5 1
legislation was beyond the grasp of human, and especially legislative,
intellect and that the New Deal independent agencies had failed their
mission. 2 An alternative, to "muddle through, 53 no doubt resonated
with the personal experience of many legislators and observers of the
48. Unfortunately, the toxic provisions of environmental statutes do not recognize the disper-
sion-concentration, singular-multiple spectra, and so it is impossible to use these to exclude any
specific regulatory initiatives from my assessment.
49. See text accompanying notes 67-99.
50. For a historical analysis from a different perspective, see Robert Glicksman and Christo-
pher H. Schroeder, EPA and the Courts: Twenty Years of Law and Politics, 54 L. & Contemp.
Probs. 249, 252-53 (Autumn 1991).
51. As Colin Diver posits, comprehensive rationality is especially disastrous when a great
deal of uncertainty and conflict exists over the problems that give rise to regulation. See Colin S.
Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 393, 428-29 (1981).
Others have sounded similar themes, in particular for environmental and occupational regulation.
See generally Richard J. Tobin, The Social Gamble (Lexington, 1979); Bruce A. Ackerman and
William T. Hassler, Beyond the New Deal: Coal and the Clean Air Act, 89 Yale L. J. 1466, (1980);
John Mendeloff, Regulating Safety: An Economic and Political Analysis of Occupational Safety
and Health Policy (MIT, 1979).
52. See, in particular, Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the
United States (Norton, 2d ed. 1979); Roger G. Noll, Reforming Regulation: An Evaluation of the
Ash Council Proposals 110 (Brookings Inst., 1971); Henry J. Friendly, The Federal Administrative
Agencies: The Need for Better Definition of Standards 160-70 (Harvard, 1962); Kenneth Culp
Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 1-55 (West, 1958).
53. See David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision: Policy Evalua-
tion as a Social Process 60-100 (Free Press, 1963); Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom,
Politics, Economics and Welfare 80-85 (Harper, 1953). Lindblom himself commented on the
problems presented by environmental regulation, finding them a particularly good example of the
need to "muddle through." See Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through," 19
Pub. Admin. Rev. 79 (1959); Charles E. Lindblom, Still Muddling, Not Yet Through, 39 Pub.
Admin. Rev. 517 (1979).
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legislative process. Congress did not heed concerns about comprehen-
sive rationality as it wrote and amended the major environmental stat-
utes in the 1970s, and agencies sought to comply with them.
The toxic substances section of environmental statutes evince the
optimism of comprehensive rationality. They were typically segregated
from other portions of the statute, and set forth stringent, health-based
standards that were to apply to all toxic substances. Yet this required
agencies to define the meaning of unacceptable risk.5 4 In such determi-
nations uncertainty is the rule.5 5 Consider the task created by the haz-
ardous substance provisions of Section 112 of the Clean Air Act. To
control pollution for one substance, the statute envisions calculating
risk envelopes, similar to those in Figure 1, for every producer across
the country (no matter what the degree of dispersion), and then speci-
fying an exposure limit. For a singular site, the simplest case, this
means identifying the excess health risk, an extraordinarily difficult
task. For numerous sites, agencies must estimate an optimal average
reduction of risks. Yet the risk envelopes will vary in size and shape
between sites depending on the concentration-dispersion of the pollu-
tion, further complicating the task. Any comprehensively rational ap-
proach thus faces a nearly intractable set of calculations and estimates.
Accordingly, the fact that toxic regulation moved very slowly in the
early 1970s is not surprising.
To overcome the difficulties of estimating the multiple risk enve-
lopes for any one substance, the Carter administration adopted a vari-
ant of the "comprehensively rational" approach. Representatives of the
various health and safety agencies jointly developed generic policies for
cancer regulation.56 In brief, since no safe threshold for exposure to car-
cinogens was thought to exist, carcinogens were to be regulated to the
greatest extent feasible, meaning the lowest exposure that technology
54. See, in particular, Sanford E. Gaines, Science, Politics and the Management of Toxic
Risks Through Law, 30 Jurimetrics J. 271, 279-82 (1990); Howard A. Latin, The "Significance" of
Toxic Health Risks: An Essay on Legal Decision Making Under Uncertainty, 10 Ecology L. Q.
339, 338-42 (1982).
55. Scientific uncertainty abounds in efforts to define the health effects of toxic pollutants.
See, for example, Brennan, 73 Cornell L. Rev. at 480 (cited in note 34); Howard Latin, Ideal Ver-
sus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and "Fine-Tuning" Regu-
latory Reforms, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1267, 1272-77 (1985); John D. Graham, The Failure of Agency
Forcing: The Regulation of Airborne Carcinogens Under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, 1985
Duke L. J. 100, 104-07 ; John D. Graham, et al., In Search of Safety: Chemicals and Cancer Risk
38-79 (Harvard, 1989). For a summary of much of this literature, see Alyson C. Flournoy, Legislat-
ing in Action: Asking the Wrong Questions in Protective Environmental Decision Making, 15
Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 327 (1991).
56. See Interagency Regulatory Liaison Group, Scientific Basis of Identification of Potential
Carcinogens and Estimations of Risk, 44 Fed. Reg. 39858 (1979).
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would allow.5" Both the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) and EPA incorporated this tenet into their generic cancer poli-
cies.58 Such policies were facially rational, and conducive to expeditious
regulation because they overcame the need to perform exquisitely diffi-
cult risk assessments. But, this rational approach irrationally over-
looked the issue of costs. While regulators studying their stringent
health-based statutory language understandably might exclude costs
from their calculations, whether Congress intended this is not clear.
More important, generic policies were anathema to regulated industries
that had to worry about costs. The generic approach was mortally
wounded by Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Pe-
troleum Institute,59 the so-called Benzene case, still the most important
of toxic substance regulation cases.60 OSHA attempted to rely on its
overarching Generic Cancer Policy as a basis for lowering benzene expo-
sure levels. Justice Stevens' plurality opinion, overturning the new stan-
dard and the underlying policy, required affirmative proof of "a
significant risk of harm and therefore a probability of significant
benefits.""'
In effect, the Court saw OSHA's comprehensive rationality attempt
as anything but, in that it constituted regulation with costs, but no
proven benefits. After Benzene, it was clear that agencies would have to
be prepared to calculate the risks posed by hazardous substances and to
57. See Thomas 0. McGarity, OSHA's Generic Cancer Policy: Rule Making Under Scientific
and Legal Uncertainty, in J.D. Nyhart and Milton M. Carrow, eds. Law and Science in Collabora-
tion 55 (Lexington, 1983).
58. See OSHA, Identification, Classification and Regulation of Potential Occupational Car-
cinogens, 45 Fed. Reg. 5002 (1980) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1990 (1991)); EPA, National Emission
Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Policy and Procedures for Identifying, Assessing and
Regulating Airborne Substances Posing a Risk of Cancer, 44 Fed. Reg. 58642 (1979).
These cancer policies contained the following principles, among others. First, they assumed
that animal bioassays could reveal substances that caused human cancer. Second, they were not to
give the same weight to negative epidemiological studies as that given to positive studies or animal
bioassays. Third, they assumed that no safe threshold for carcinogens exists. Fourth, they assumed
that carcinogens were not site-specific; that is, the EPA thought that a carcinogen in a particular
site in an animal was capable of causing cancer in another site in a human being. Finally, the
policies emphasized safety in that they assumed worst-case estimates and emphasized prevention
of illness in any quantitative assessment.
59. 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (Benzene).
60. The case is often used as a paradigm of crisis in administrative law. See Christopher
Edley, Jr., The Governance Crisis, Legal Theory, and Political Ideology, 1991 Duke L. J. 561, 571
(stating that the Benzene case reflects commingling of scientific, political and fairness paradigms).
61. See Benzene, 448 U.S. at 644. The Court did not require an explicit cost-benefit analysis,
and indeed rejected this interpretation explicitly under another section of OSHA later the same
year. See American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981). Nonetheless, the
weighing called for in Benzene has much the same effect as would an explicit endorsement of
formal cost-benefit analysis.
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define the costs of regulation on a case by case basis.62 The Reagan ad-
ministration did not attempt to redefine the OSHA Generic Cancer Pol-
icy. Perhaps more telling, EPA abandoned generic policies in the mid-
1980s and now insists that each substance must be judged
independently.63
Now regulators face an even more stunning (and perhaps stunting)
task. Not only must they calculate and summarize risk envelopes, but
they must develop cost estimates for each polluter as well . 4 Since the
exposed population around every source varies, costs will also vary.
Thus, even if each source had similar risk envelopes, the cost estimates
for each site could be quite different. Moreover, singular standards may
produce different levels of risk reduction. For example, reducing levels
of ambient atmospheric benzene near a steel mill with various toxic
plumes may be very expensive. If this mill is situated in a thinly popu-
lated area with strong prevailing winds, there might be very little risk
reduction for this cost. On the other hand, controls at a smelter in a
densely populated area may be very cost-effective from a risk reduction
viewpoint. Integrating all of this information from multiple sites to pro-
duce a single rational overarching standard seems impossible. While the
health-based statutory language must be modified by attention to costs,
the cost-benefit goals are not specified in cases like Benzene. Hence, the
difficulty of getting the cost-benefit analysis right will continue to
trouble toxic substance regulation. 5 Neither regulators nor judges have
the luxury of concentrating their attention on a single source.
62. For a recent illuminating discussion of those aspects of the Benzene decision, see Frank
B. Cross, Daniel M. Byrd, III, and Lester B. Lave, Discernible Risk-A Proposed Standard for
Significant Risk in Carcinogen Regulation, 43 Admin. L. Rev. 61 (1991).
63. See EPA, Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 51 Fed. Reg. 33992 (1986). Some
of the assumptions now underlying EPA's approach are at variance with the more conservative
points of the Interagency Regulatory Liaison Group's cancer policy. See Howard Latin, Good Sci-
ence, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5 Yale J. Reg. 89, 98-105 (1988).
Industry has become so emboldened by agency backpedaling on cancer risks that they have
sued to overturn the policies utilized by the National Toxicology Program to identify carcinogens.
See Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfrs. v. Secretary, Dep't of Health and Human Sciences, 720 F.
Supp. 1244 (W.D. La. 1989) (denying motion by chemical manufacturers for preliminary injunction
against publication of the Fifth Annual Report on Carcinogens, which focused particularly on chlo-
rinated paraffin, ethyl acrylate, tetrachloroethylene, methylene chloride, and paradichlorobenzene).
64. See Sidney A. Shapiro and Thomas 0. McGarity, Not So Paradoxical: The Rationale for
Technology-Based Regulation, 1991 Duke L. J. 729, 732-33 (discussion of the problems with ex
ante risk assessment).
65. A very instructive recent case is Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 22 Envtl. Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 1606 (1991) (overturning EPA ban on asbestos products). See also Arthur Fraas, The Role
of Economic Analysis in Shaping Environmental Policy, 54 L. & Contemp. Probs. 113, 122-24
(Autumn 1991) (discussing the economic benefit of eliminating asbestos). Even an attempt simply
to take all potential factors into account, without any attempt at synthesis, may be daunting. See
Thomas 0. McGarity, The Internal Structure of EPA Rulemaking, 54 L. & Contemp. Probs. 57,
80 (Autumn 1991).
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Given the uncertainty surrounding risk assessment, regulators have
been driven primarily by fear of reversal when courts analyze their risk
assessment reasoning. 6 Courts have sympathized with agency hesitance
when it is justified by a request to develop better information,6 7 or be-
cause the agency claims an inability to undertake data collection due to
limited resources.6" Since agency interpretation of statutory language is
in some measure unreviewable after the Chevron decision, 9 delays in
toxic regulation under health-based statutes should be expected.70
At least partially in light of the standoff over health-based statutes
and cost-benefit analysis, agencies have developed another way to regu-
late toxic substances, one that emphasizes technological solutions. In
cases of nontoxic pollution, agencies have long relied on technology-
based standards that specify controls for various processes or indus-
tries.7' On the toxic side, this approach allows the agency to procrasti-
nate about health assessments until the technology is in place.
Technology-based regulation thus permits an agency to muddle through
in an incremental fashion.72
Incrementalism has several theoretical advantages over the hercu-
lean task of health-based regulation of toxic substances. It seemingly
offers some potential for site specificity. Incrementalism also allows for
feedback. An agency can reverse bad, that is, over- or under-risk reduc-
tion decisions, quickly with relatively low costs. 73 On the other hand,
the incremental process is slow, and incremental changes can be very
small. Unlike a singular standard that is intended to reduce risk to a
safe level, technological approaches overtly accept ongoing exposure to
66. See, in particular, John M. Mendeloff, The Dilemma of Toxic Substance Regulation 115-
22 (MIT, 1988) (detailing how fear of judicial reversal motivates many agency decisions).
67. See, for example, Sierra Club v. Thomas, 828 F.2d 783, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1987); United
Steelworkers of America v. Rubber Mfrs. Ass'n, 783 F.2d 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
68. See, for example, Cutler v. Hayes, 818 F.2d 879, 898 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Public Citizen
Health Research Group v. Commissioner, FDA, 740 F.2d 21, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Public Citizen
Health Research Group v. Auchter, 702 F.2d 1150, 1158 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
69. See Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See also
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985); Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heck-
ler v. Chaney, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 653 (1985).
70. Unfortunately, this will lead to some quantifiable increases in mortality as a result of
agency delay. See William J. Nicholson and Philip J. Landrigan, Quantitative Assessment of Lives
Lost Due to Delay in the Regulation of Occupational Exposure to Benzene, 82 Envtl. Health
Persp. 185 (1989) (stating that between 1978 and 1987, 30 to 490 excess leukemia deaths resulted
from occupational exposures to benzene of greater than one part per million).
71. See John E. Bonine and Thomas L. McGarity, The Law of Environmental Protection
256-63 (West, 2d ed. 1991) (discussing the use of technological feasibility in the Clean Water Act).
72. Judge Leventhal recognized this development years before it was clear to other commen-
tators. He noted that technological feasibility had to emerge as the core issue in analysis of health
and safety standards. See Harold Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of
Courts, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 509, 531-35 (1974).
73. Clayton Gillette suggested the reversibility benefit of incremental approaches.
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toxic levels of pollutants as the technology improves. Risks still may
exist, especially at particular point sources, leaving small areas still ex-
posed to high levels of toxic substances. While health-based regulation
appears to have failed, incrementalism is not guaranteed to produce sig-
nificant risk reduction. However, technological solutions do create a
sense that regulation is "working," which must appeal to most regula-
tors and elected representatives. Difficult risk reduction estimates can
be postponed.
The rather extensive report card on incrementalism is not encour-
aging.74 Consider illustrative examples from the water and air acts.
Their toxic substance provisions were intended to curtail exposure to
hazardous substances in water and air expeditiously and they presuma-
bly encouraged agencies to undertake comprehensively rational ap-
proaches. In both instances, those approaches have failed; and in both
cases, EPA has decided to pursue an incrementalist approach that puts
off the need to assess the burden of toxic substance-induced disease.75
In the Clean Water Act,7 6 as with the Clean Air Act, Congress seg-
regated the control of toxic pollutants from other aspects of the regula-
tory structure. In the 1972 legislation, Section 307 defined toxic
pollutants broadly7" and required either an ample margin of safety or a
prohibition of discharge.78 The Act did not provide for consideration of
feasibility issues or cost, unlike those sections dealing with conventional
discharges. 7 Congress intended this comprehensively rational approach
to require that EPA move quickly to regulate water toxins stringently.
74. Much of this argument is based on a more detailed discussion in a previous work. See
Troyen A. Brennan, Narrowing the Wide Open Spaces: ALI Discussion Paper (1990) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with author). Others have also noted the move towards technology-based
standards. See James C. Robinson and William S. Pease, From Health-Based to Technology-
Based Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants, 81 Am. J. Pub. Health 1518 (1991).
75. John Dwyer has cited the toxic substance provisions of the original Clean Air Act (Sec-
tion 112) and the Clean Water Act (Section 307) as examples of "regulatory statutes [that] impose
short deadlines and stringent standard setting criteria that are designed to address a single over-
riding concern, to the exclusion of other factors." John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic
Legislation, 17 Ecol. L. Q. 233 (1990).
76. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 ("FWPCA"), Pub. L. No. 92-
500, 86 Stat. 816,; Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566. These provisions are
codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1988).
77. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(13) (1988) (Clean Water Act § 502(13)), which defines "toxic pollu-
tant" as:
those pollutants, or combinations of pollutants, including disease-causing agents, which after
discharge and upon exposure, ingestion, inhalation or assimilation into any organism, either
directly from the environment or indirectly by ingestion through food chains, will, on the
basis of information available to the Administrator, cause death, disease, behavior abnormali-
ties, cancer, genetic mutations, physiological malfunctions (including malfunctions in repro-
duction) or physical deformations, in such organisms.
78. See FWPCA § 307(a)(2), (a)(4), codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(2), (a)(4) (1988).
79. See 33 U.S.C. § 1316.
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As might be expected with such health-based regulation, just the
opposite occurred. After passage of the 1972 Amendments, the Admin-
istrator slowly developed a toxic pollutant list that contained only eight
substances.8 0 At the beginning of the Carter administration, the Flan-
nery decree allowed the EPA to retreat from the absolutist health-
based standards of the original Section 307 in exchange for action on a
variety of pollutants." This negotiation, involving only environmental-
ists and EPA, created an incrementalist approach to toxic substances in
water that Congress had not envisioned in the original legislation.8 2
Under the original decree, at the completion of the engineering ap-
proach to water toxics, EPA was obligated to promulgate certain water
quality criteria for the sixty-five listed pollutants. By the mid-1980s,
many industries had the required "best available technology" (BAT) in
place. Unfortunately, the status of toxins in water was still quite uncer-
tain. 3 Thus, the 1987 Amendments to the Clean Water Act turned to
the states, requiring them to promulgate strategies for achieving spe-
cific standards in those areas where the BAT controls had proven inef-
80. These included aldrin-dieldrin, benzidine, cadmium, cyanide, DDD-DDE-DDT, endrin,
mercury, poIychlorinated biphenyls, and toxaphene. See EPA, Toxic Pollutant Effluent Stan-
dards, 38 Fed. Reg. 24342 (1972). This weak effort itself was prompted by a court order. See Natu-
ral Resources Def. Council v. Fri, 3 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,587 (D.D.C. 1973). Further
litigation ensued, and eventually both environmentalists and EPA decided that perhaps a negoti-
ated settlement was more appropriate than continued legal fighting over EPA's pace. See William
H. Rogers, 2 Environmental Law § 4.33 at 480-81 (West, 1986).
81. See Natural Resources Def. Council v. Train, 8 Envtl. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2120 (D.D.C.
1976), modified sub nom. Natural Resources Def. Council v. Costle, 12 Envtl. Rep. Cas. (BNA)
1833 (D.D.C. 1979). The agreement committed the Administrator to development of a large num-
ber of point source standards (21 major industries that were each discharging a number of toxic
pollutants-65 point sources in total). These standards were fundamentally technology-based, fea-
turing engineering controls. The agreement retained only a few of the original health-based stan-
dards. For example, under the Flannery decree, cadmium, mercury, and lead, the heavy metals
now thought to be among the most toxic of industrial substances, were shifted to engineering
control.
The 1977 legislation endorsed the premises of the Flannery decree. See Environmental Def.
Fund v. Costle, 636 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1980), appeal after remand sub nom. Citizens for a Better
Envir. v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1983). As the court of appeals noted:
[Bloth Congress's substitution of an industry-by-industry, technology-based BAT [best avail-
able technology] approach for the pollutant-by-pollutant, health-based approach required by
Section 307 of the FWPCA, and its decision to specify a list of 65 pollutants-the same pollu-
tants listed in the Agreement-that were to be included in EPA's revised list of toxic pollu-
tants under Section (307)(a), amounted to little more than an 'attempt to conform the statute
to the reality of [the] program' EPA had been developing under the terms of the settlement
agreement.
636 F.2d at 1241.
82. Litigation under the original health-based standards had resulted in judicial affirmation
of the more stringent approach. See, for example, Hercules Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (concerning toxaphene and endrin); Envirironmental Def. Fund v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62 (D.C.
Cir. 1978) (concerning polychlorinated biphenyls).
83. See Gaines, 30 Jurimetrics J. at 300 (cited in note 54).
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fective.8 The Amendments also required EPA to promulgate effluent
guidelines in a timely manner.15 EPA's delays eventually led to yet an-
other suit by environmentalists, and a new consent decree.8 6 At this
point, fifteen years into the regime established by the Flannery decree,
great uncertainty remains about how free the surface water is of toxic
substances.8 7 Moreover, Congress clearly perceives the need to employ
health-based media standards to meet the challenge of toxic hot spots
that remain after a technology-based program has matured.
84. See the Water Quality Act of 1987 § 304(l)(1)-(l)(3), Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 38
(1987), codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1314(l)(1)-(l)(3) (1988). States were to identify the hot spots and
develop plans for new strategies for reducing toxic pollution, using specific numerical criteria. See
Lawrence R. Liebesman and Elliott P. Laws, The Water Quality Act of 1987: A Major Step in
Assuring the Quality of the Nation's Waters, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10311, 10320-21
(1987). Congress was clearly dissatisfied with the gaps left in toxic control by BAT methods. See S
1003-02, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 21, 1987), in 133 Cong. Rec. 1260-61 (1987) (comments of Sen.
Burdick). See also Environmental and Nat. Res. Policy Div. of the Congressional Research Service,
100th Cong., 2d Sess., A Legislative History of the Water Quality Act of 1987 at 125-30 (Comm.
Print, 1988).
Following the 1987 Amendments, states have moved quite slowly to develop the new water
standards, and EPA has threatened to intervene. The EPA subsequently stated that it would write
its own water quality standards, since the states had failed to enact the standards as they were
instructed by the Clean Water Act Amendments of 1987. The risk threshold incorporated into
these water standards was to be one in one million for exposed individuals. See States Failure to
Set Toxics Criteria Leads EPA to Write Water Quality Standards, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 1985 (1990). The EPA apparently has the authority to object to state standards, or the lack
thereof. See American Paper Inst. v. EPA, 890 F.2d 869 (7th Cir. 1989) (affirming EPA's authority
to review state quality standards).
85. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(m) (1988).
86. Natural Resources Def. Council v. Reilly, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,108
(D.D.C. 1991). On August 25, 1988, six months after the Section 1314(m)(1) deadline had expired,
EPA published its first proposed plan, 53 Fed. Reg. 32584 (1988), which identified ten industry
categories as "potential candidates" for regulation, and five categories of existing effluent limita-
tion guidelines for review. The final plan, which followed this proposal, was issued on January 2,
1990. 55 Fed. Reg. 803 (1990). It identified only three categories for review and three for revision of
existing guidelines, with schedules extending into the mid-1990s for promulgation of guidelines for
five new categories. In a memorandum opinion handed down on April 23, 1991, Judge Royce Lam-
berth found EPA to be in violation of Section 1314(m) and ordered that a status conference be
held at which the court would "set a schedule for the establishment of a timetable for the proper
implementation of 33 U.S.C. § 1314(m)." 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,112.
The court issued a consent decree on January 31, 1992, committing EPA to a strict timetable
for both the proposal and the final promulgation of effluent guidelines for 18 industry categories.
57 Fed. Reg. 19748, 19750 (1992). In addition, the decree requires EPA to establish a "special task
force" composed of representatives from government, citizen groups and scientific organizations.
The decision gives this task force wide authority to advise EPA on the entire process of promulgat-
ing effluent guidelines, but it is too soon to tell how EPA receives its advice. Finally, the decree
requires future rulemaking plans to comply with Section 1314(m), provides for modifications and
stays of deadlines in the decree, and provides that the decree is subject to other applicable laws,
including appropriations law.
87. EPA does not break out surface water toxins in its analysis of the relative priorities of
various health hazards in the environment. See EPA, Comparing Risks and Setting Environmen-
tal Priorities: Overview of Three Regional Projects 40-41 (EPA, 1989). In some regions, however,
industrial point sources remain a source of hazardous pollution. Id.
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The toxic air pollution story is remarkably similar, although the
decision to move to incrementalism was longer in coming."' W. H. Rog-
ers has noted that the hazardous air pollution provisions of Section 112
"stand out as one of the major disappointments of the Clean Air Act,"' 9
an opinion that has been shared by many commentators. 0
The reasons for such disappointment are now familiar. Congress
had not ignored the risks posed by hazardous air pollutants.91 On the
contrary, Congress clearly intended that the Clean Air Act of 1970 regu-
late these risks with much greater rigor than other forms of air pollu-
tion.2 As signed into law by a reluctant President Nixon, Section 112,
88. The Clean Air Act is one of the most complicated regulatory structures in our govern-
ment. It takes up 118 pages of the United States Code and as of 1985, regulations created pursuant
to the Act required four volumes in the Code of Federal Regulations. See Frederick R. Anderson,
et al., Environmental Protection: Law and Policy 162-63 (Little, Brown, 2d ed. 1990). The multi-
level structure of the Clean Air Act, a product of creative congressional action and ample use of
EPA rulemaking authority, has been credited with cleaning the air. Especially with regard to the
criteria pollutants, information indicates that air quality has improved in many large American
cities. By 1980, sulfur oxides and carbon monoxide levels had dropped significantly. See EPA,
Office of Planning and Evaluation, National Accomplishments in Pollution Control: 1970-1980:
Some Case Histories 82-97 (EPA, 1980). The pollution standard index, the measurement of how
frequently air quality is bad enough to create health risks, had improved consistently over the
decade from 1975 to 1985. See Conservation Foundation, State of the Environment: An Assess-
ment at Mid-Decade 89 (R.R. Donnelley & Sons, 1984). Nonetheless, the most recent EPA data
suggests that in several regions, ozone and other criteria air pollutants are amongst the most signif-
icant health hazards in the environment. See EPA, Comparing Risks at 38-39 (cited in note 87).
89. Rogers, Environmental Law § 3.2 at 343 (cited in note 80).
90. See, for example, Gary E. Marchant and Dawn P. Danzeisen, "Acceptable" Risk for Haz-
ardous Air Pollutants, 13 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 535 (1989); Alan Jay Goldberg, Note, Toward Sen-
sible Regulation of Hazardous Air Pollutants Under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, 63 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 612 (1988); Frank B. Cross, Section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act: A New Approach to the
Control of Airborne Carcinogens, 13 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 215 (1986); Graham, 1985 Duke L. J.
at 100 (cited in note 55).
Environmentalists and representatives of the state governments and industry have all ex-
pressed their views on the drawbacks of Section 112 in the late 1980s. See Clean Air Act (Part 2):
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the House Committee on
Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 698-708 (1981) (CAA Hearings) (testimony of David
Doniger, Natural Resources Defense Council senior project attorney); Health Standards for Air
Pollutants: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the House Com-
mittee on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 235 (1981) (statement of Robert Abrams,
Attorney General of the State of New York); CAA Hearings at 722-30 (calling EPA's approach to
control of hazardous air pollutants in courts "simplistic," "counter-productive" and "inappropri-
ate") (statement of Chemical Manufacturers Association representative).
91. The statutory definition of hazardous air pollutants is "an air pollutant to which no am-
bient air quality standard is applicable and which in the judgment of the Administrator causes, or
contributes to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to result in an increase in mor-
tality or an increase in serious, irreversible or incapacitating reversible, illness." 42 U.S.C. §
7412(a)(1) (1988).
92. The mechanism for controlling exposures to hazardous substances was the result of a
compromise between the House and the Senate in 1970. The original House bill had no specific
section for hazardous air pollutants. See A Legislative History of the Clean Air Amendments of
1970, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 195-97 (Jan. 1974). The Senate bill, on the other hand, set forth methods
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dealing with toxic substances, presented a simple but demanding regu-
latory framework: EPA was to regulate the listed pollutants with an
ample margin of safety. 3 But, beneath this relatively straightforward
regulatory apparatus lay the same conundrum that visits any effort to
regulate hazardous substances like carcinogens. If one accepts a no-
threshold level for risks posed by the carcinogen-that is, that any
amount of carcinogen can cause cancer-then developing an ample
margin of safety without forbidding exposure to such substances is im-
possible. While parts of the Clean Air Act of 1970 were passed in recog-
nition of the fact that some outdated plants producing large amounts of
pollution might have to be closed, Congress apparently did not intend
to close entire industries because they present some small, but specifia-
ble risk."4 Yet the language of Section 112 appeared to require closure
for industries that produced air pollution with trace amounts of carcin-
ogens, a step likely associated with unacceptably high economic costs.
Hence, EPA was left with a statute that called for what sounded like a
comprehensively rational approach to regulation, but was in reality po-
litically and economically infeasible.
for creating a list of hazardous air pollutants and formulated a nondiscretionary duty to regulate
the pollutants within a specific period of time. Id. at 495-98. The Senate Committee Report also
defined "hazardous" conservatively, and allowed draconian regulatory responses when necessary to
overcome dangers to health: "[A] global prohibition on emissions is a step to be taken only where a
danger of health as defined exists." Id. at 420.
In conference, Congress formulated a slightly less conservative definition of "hazardous air
pollutant" and required the Administrator to set emission standards "at the level which in his
judgment provides an ample margin of safety to protect the public health from such hazardous air
pollutant." 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(B) (1988). The "may reasonably be anticipated to" portion of
the definition of hazardous air pollutant, id. § 7412(a)(1), was added in 1977 to emphasize the
precautionary or preventive purpose of the Act, see Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, H.R. Rep.
No. 95294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1128-29.
93. The Administrator was to publish a list that "includes each hazardous air pollutant for
which he intends to establish an emission standard under this section." 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(A)
(1988). The Administrator was then to publish proposed regulations within 180 days after the
appearance of any pollutant on the list. After a public hearing on the proposed regulations, the
Administrator had another 180 days to "prescribe an emission standard for such pollutant, unless
he finds, on the basis of information presented at such hearings, that such pollutant clearly is not a
hazardous air pollutant." Id. § 7412(b)(1)(B). Congress intended that this emission standard create
the ample margin of safety specified above.
94. As Senator Muskie noted in 1977:
[T]he Clean Air Act [of 1970] is based on the assumption, although we knew at the time it
was inaccurate, that there is a threshold. When we set the standards, we understood that
below the standard that we set there would still be health effects. The standard we picked
was simply the best judgment we had on the basis of the available evidence as to what the
unacceptable health effects in terms of the country as a whole would be.
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Environmental Pollu-
tion of the Senate Committee on the Environment and Public Works, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. at part
3, 8 (1977). While Senator Muskie was referring to automotive emission standards, his remarks are
much more acute in consideration of regulation of toxic emissions like carcinogens.
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-The initial efforts under Section 112 revealed EPA's reluctance to
dislocate the economy on behalf of those exposed to airborne carcino-
gens.95 But, unlike the accommodation under the Clean Water Act, en-
vironmentalists were not willing to accept incrementalism in Section
112, as the decade-long vinyl chloride litigation revealed.96 In one last
95. See EPA, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Asbestos, Beryl-
lium, Mercury, 38 Fed. Reg. 8820 (1973) (discussing asbestos exposure during demolition and con-
struction projects). See also Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275 (1978) (approving
a series of work practice standards rather than emission standards).
96. In its first proposed rule, EPA noted that since it was a carcinogen, vinyl chloride may
not be safe at any level. See EPA, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants:
Proposed Standard for Vinyl Chloride, 40 Fed. Reg. 59532, 59533 (1975). As a result, environmen-
talists argued that EPA should ban vinyl chloride when alternatives were available and eventually
phase out the remaining uses of the substance. See EPA, National Emission Standards for Haz-
ardous Air Pollutants: Standard for Vinyl Chloride, 41 Fed. Reg. 46560, 46561-62 (1976) (review
of comments to proposed regulations). Manufacturers suggested that emission standards should be
set on a case-by-case basis using cost-benefit analysis. Id. at 46562. The EPA rejected both options
and advocated a BAT approach. Predictably, EPA was sued by public health advocates who noted
that Section 112 sanctioned neither cost-benefit analysis nor BAT. See Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598
F.2d 91, 113 n.42 (1978) (citing Environmental Def. Fund v. Train, No. 76-2405 (D.C. Cir. June 24,
1977) (unreported settlement and dismissal of petition for review of vinyl chloride regulations)).
The Environmental Defense Fund voluntarily dismissed this case when EPA agreed to produce a
more stringent standard and to set, as a goal, zero vinyl chloride emissions. But the failure of
OSHA's generic cancer policy in the Benzene decision indicated that EPA could not employ "com-
prehensively rational" policies to regulate carcinogens as was contemplated when the Environmen-
tal Defense Fund dismissed its suit.
With the onset of the Reagan administration's regulatory reform policies, little further was
done to address the problems of airborne carcinogens. By the mid-1980s, environmentalists had
sufficiently focused their interests in air pollution carcinogens to lead to a more conclusive court
battle. On January 9, 1985, EPA withdrew the proposals set forth as part of its 1977 settlement
with the Environmental Defense Fund and proceeded with a slightly revised version of the original
1976 regulation. See EPA, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Vinyl
Chloride, 50 Fed. Reg. 1182 (1985). This prompted a suit by the Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil in the Court of Appeals.
In 1986, Judge Bork, on behalf of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals panel, issued an opinion
that generally supported EPA's decision to forego health-based regulation of toxics in air. See
Natural Resources Def. Council v. EPA, 804 F.2d 710 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Relying on statutory lan-
guage and legislative history, Bork wrote that an emission standard should not necessarily be
equivalent to prohibition. Rather, he stated that it was reasonable to assume that the Administra-
tor might appropriately take into account factors other than health. Id. at 718-19. On the other
hand, the court rejected EPA's proposition that the 1977 Amendments to the Clean Air Act had
essentially ratified the use of cost and technology feasibility considerations under Section 112. Id.
at 719. Given this apparent standoff, Bork relied on the Supreme Court's holding in Chevron
U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 to rule that EPA had made a reasonable
interpretation of its statutory requirements. Thus, the court affirmed EPA's decision to withdraw
the 1977 proposed regulation.
In a stinging dissent, Judge Skelly Wright pointed out that the Administration's position di-
rectly contravened the clear language of Section 112. 804 F.2d at 727 (Wright dissenting). Wright
stated that the no-threshold view of carcinogens means that an ample margin of safety for all
exposed can occur only by shutting down the industries that emit such substances. Id. at 737-38
(Wright dissenting).
The D.C. Circuit decided to rehear the case en banc. The opinion of the en banc court, again
written by Judge Bork, outlined a compromise solution that removed some of EPA's burden to
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effort to develop generic "comprehensively rational" policies, EPA pro-
posed regulations on the meaning of acceptable risk 7 and issued a final
rule for the hazardous air pollutant benzene that discussed in great de-
tail the problems with setting health-based standards.98 The rule hesi-
tatingly endorsed the use of an individual risk level of one death in
10,000 for any one individual.99 Predictably, environmentalists were dis-
pleased with the final rule.100 The bottom line is that twenty years had
elapsed without significant regulation of airborne toxins.
Another round of litigation was avoided though, as attention
shifted to the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, which created a tech-
nology basis for toxic-substance regulation. l ' Strikingly, the amend-
regulate airborne carcinogens under Section 112. Natural Resources Def. Council v. EPA, 824 F.2d
1146, 1155-56 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The opinion clarified that fact that EPA no longer had to consider
a zero-risk level as the only safe level. Allowing that the legislative history of. Section 112 was
ambiguous, the court noted that although EPA primarily must consider health under Section 112,
EPA permissibly may consider other factors as well. Id. at 1164. Relying on the Benzene decision,
the panel noted that "safe" does not necessarily mean "risk-free." Id. at 1165 (citing Benzene, 448
U.S. at 642). After estimating the level of safety, the Administrator must determine an ample
margin, and may use feasibility considerations in this determination. The Administrator was to
employ these economic and technological considerations only for setting a level of safety below
that which is considered safe, not in the determination of what is safe.
97. See EPA, Proposed Rule for National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollu-
tants: Regulation of Radionuclides, 54 Fed. Reg. 9612 (1989). In the proposed rule, the Agency set
forth several methods of risk assessment. Approach A involved determinations of both maximum
individual risk and the risk incidence in the population as a whole. EPA would use these factors in
case-by-case assessments. This entailed a tradeoff between the maximum individual risks, which
would be one additional fatal cancer in 10,000 exposed individuals, and the total expected inci-
dence of disease in the entire United States population. For instance, EPA might allow the indi-
vidual risks posed to those living near a stationary source to rise if the total expected incidence
was lower.
The other approaches centered on either total incidence or level of individual risk. Approach
B considered only the total expected incidence, and controlled emissions such that they would not
increase the total of fatal cancers by more than one case per year. The regulations based Ap-
proaches C and D only on individual risks. Approach C used a threshold of one in 10,000 risk,
while Approach D employed a threshold of one in one million risk. Id. at 9622-40.
EPA asserted that Approach C would lead to a closure of 100 facilities and loss of 30,000 jobs,
while Approach D would require closing all petroleum refineries and chemical plants in the United
States. As might be expected, both environmental activists and industry concerns expressed some
dissatisfaction with EPA's theory as well as its risk estimates. See Gary Marchant and Dawn
Danzeisen, 13 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. at 538-40 (cited in note 90).
98. EPA, Final Rule: National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Benzene
Emissions, 54 Fed. Reg. 38044 (1989).
99. If the risk exceeded the threshold, the EPA was to integrate other health and risk fac-
tors into an overall judgment on acceptability. Thereafter, the agency would set a standard that
reflects "an ample margin of safety," to minimize the number of people who were exposed to a
greater than one in one million lifetime risk. Id. at 38050-52.
100. Interview with Jacqueline Warren, Staff Attorney, Natural Resources Def. Council (May
14, 1990).
101. The 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act include an extensive revision of the section
regulating hazardous air pollutants (HAPs). 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412 (West Supp. 1992) (Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990 § 112, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2574 (1990)). In the Amendments,
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ments contain no risk threshold of the sort that had previously
dominated EPA's thinking about hazardous air pollutants. 102 The basis
for emission standards in the new Act is "technically possible maximum
reductions. 1 s0 3 While the 1990 Amendments do not specify risk levels,
they do provide for further consideration of acceptable risk.10 4
The Clean Air Act Amendments reflect a commitment to make
toxic pollution control "workable." Yet residual risk estimation will be-
come critical as time passes. The Senate version of the air toxins provi-
sions of the Clean Air Act Amendments had prescribed specific risk
levels that would be tolerated. 10 5 The eventually adopted House ver-
Congress listed 189 HAPs for which EPA must establish NESHAPs. EPA must revise this list
"periodically," although the Amendments provide no schedule for such revision. Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990 § 303, to be codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412 (West 1992).
The 1990 Amendments direct the EPA to establish standards based on the use of "maximum
achievable control technology" (MACT). See Theodore L. Garrett and Sonya D. Winner, A Clean
Air Act Primer: Part I, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10159, 10163 (Mar. 1992). This implies
that an industry may still release a carcinogenic chemical that has no safety threshold but has
emissions that current technology cannot completely eliminate. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(d)(2) (West
Supp. 1992) (stating that NESHAPs may include "a prohibition on such emissions, where achieva-
ble"). The Amendments also allow the EPA to consider "the cost of achieving such emission reduc-
tion" in setting emission standards. Id. § 7412(d)(2) (West Supp. 1992).
102. The Senate bill had set two standards for assessing residual risk after applying MACT.
The first risk standard was one in one million risk for the most exposed individual. Sources that
continued to pose this level of risk could receive case-by-case exceptions if they demonstrated that
lower risks were not achievable using nonpollution-control technology. The second risk standard
was one in 10,000. When sources exceeded this threshold, EPA could grant them a one-time, five-
year extension. Failure to comply at the end of that extension would result in shut-down. See
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1989: Report of the Committee on Environment and Public Works
of the United States Senate, S. Rep. No. 101-228, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 148 (1989) (Committee on
Environment Report).
The Senate version also required the EPA to set risk according to the maximum exposed
actual person. It even specified the method for calculating this exposure (involving one standard
deviation beyond the mean exposure value). Thus, the Senate version brightlined the level of risk
that was tolerable and explicitly required shut-down of a facility that failed to meet the standard.
103. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 § 112(d)(2).
104. The new Section 7412(f) requires EPA to study the residual risks remaining after the
application of MACT controls. It also requires that the EPA report to Congress by November 15,
1996 with recommendations for further legislation. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(f)(2) (West Supp. 1992). If
Congress does not act on these recommendations, Section 7412(f) requires EPA to revert to its
former health-based standards and promulgate additional regulations for each source category for
which EPA finds residual risks. These measures are intended to ensure "an ample margin of safety
to protect public health." Id. § 7412(d)(4). EPA must promulgate residual risk regulations for any
known human carcinogen for which MACT controls have not reduced the most exposed individ-
ual's express cancer risk to less than one in one million. Congress has failed to define "most ex-
posed individual," however, so Section 7412(f) is unclear as to whether this is a theoretical or an
actual individual. This issue is likely to cause problems when EPA proposes its residual risk regu-
lations. In addition, Section 7412(f) still allows EPA to take "costs, energy, safety and other rele-
vant factors" into consideration in setting residual risk standards. Id.
105. In essence, the maximally exposed individual may not have a risk of cancer of greater
than one in ten thousand after a lifetime exposure. If an individual is so exposed, EPA would shut
the plant down. See Committee on Environment Report (cited in note 102).
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sion, which seemed politically more attractive given the level of concern
about the costs of the new Clean Air Act,10 6 was mute about what level
of risk might be acceptable.
The toxic substance provisions of the Clean Air Act thus look to a
future that is now the reality under the Clean Water Act. Once technol-
ogy standards are in place, one still is faced with toxic hot spots, and
then the need to set media standards that focus on health. An incre-
mental, technology-based approach leads to manageable costs, but it
does not provide "an ample margin of safety." Some discrete communi-
ties will continue to be exposed to hazardous pollutants. 10 7 This will be
especially true with respect to air toxins. At present, Congress assumes
that 1,700 to 2,700 excess cancer cases per year nation wide are attribu-
table to hazardous air pollutants. 10 8 This cancer impact is not spread
diffusely over the entire country, as more or less occurs with dispersed
criteria pollutants, but is focused on particular facilities. 0 9 Especially in
cases of the concentrated, single-source paradigm of air pollution, iden-
tifiable individuals are at risk.
The inability of regulators operating under the Clean Water and
Clean Air Acts to guarantee that discrete communities are not exposed
106. Cost of Implementing Air Legislation Could Reach Ninety-One Billion, Industry
Group Says, 21 Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 656 (Aug. 3, 1990).
107. Rulemaking under the 1990 Amendments has been slow. See, for example, EPA Plans
to Cut Number of Categories of Industrial Sources Regulated by Air Act, 22 Envtl. Rep. (BNA)
1558 (Oct. 18, 1991) (discussing EPA's announcement that its rule listing source categories under
Section 7412(c)(1), due November 15, 1991, will be two months late). This has prompted the Sierra
Club Legal Defense Fund to give notice that it will sue EPA to force the agency to comply with the
statutory schedule. Sierra Club Gives EPA Notice It Will Sue to Shake Loose 50 Overdue Air Act
Regulations, 23 Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 425 (May 29, 1992).
The emphasis on MACT "fixes" has led to some bizarre results. In one case, EPA proposed to
allow an Idaho phosphorus plant to more than double its radionuclide emissions (from 2.2 curies/
yr. to 4.5 curies/yr.) in return for the owner's installation of a specific scrubbing system. Proposal
Allows More Radionuclide Emissions in Return for Applying New Control Technology, 22 Envtl.
Rep. (BNA) 1301 (Sept. 13, 1991). Also, the General Accounting Office has criticized EPA repeat-
edly for failing to request enough money to carry out the studies needed to set NESHAPs accord-
ing to the statutory schedule. Plan to Cut Toxics Under Air Act Inadequate, Underfunded, GAO
Charges, 22 Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 1027 (Aug. 9, 1991); House Subcommittee Questions EPA Funding
for Clear Air Act Industrial Toxics Provisions, 22 Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 1767 (Nov. 15, 1991).
108. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990: Report of the Committee on Energy and Com-
merce of the United States House of Representatives on H.R. 3030, H.R. No. 490, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess. 316 (1990).
109. In January 1990, EPA had found 149 facilities associated with lifetime cancer risks in
exposed individuals of greater than one in 10,000. Among these were 52 plants in which cancer
risks were greater than one in 1000; seven with cancer risks greater than one in 100; and one with a
risk for the surrounding inhabitants of one in 10. Id. at 317, citing EPA, Office of Air Radiation,
Updated Source-Specific Cancer Risk Information, Air Toxic Exposure and Risk Information
System (ATERIS), provided to Rep. Henry A. Waxman, January 10, 1990. EPA based these esti-
mates on emissions caused by a single toxic air pollutant from each plant. In reality, many plants
emit several carcinogens, a fact that could multiply isolated risk assessments.
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to dangerous risk envelopes of hazardous substances extends beyond
these statutory regimes. The enforcement histories of the Safe Drinking
Water Act (SDWA)110 , Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide
Act (FIFRA),111 Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)1 2 and the Re-
sources Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) recount similar sto-
ries. ' The risk assessments necessary to undertake health-based rules,
which would outlaw unsafe pollution, frustrate administrators. The
problem is partially intellectual, since risk assessment involves so much
uncertainty about both health and economics, and partially a result of a
110. Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300(f) to 300()-26 (1988). See also Goldberg, 63
N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 656 (cited in note 90); Gaines, 30 Jurimetrics J. at 311 (cited in note 54).
111. See Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 136-
136(y) (West 1980 & Supp. 1992). Cross has identified a variety of risk assessments completed by
EPA under FIFRA and notes that they range from one in a million to up to as high as one in a
thousand. See Frank B. Cross, Beyond Benzene: Establishing Principles for a Significance
Threshold on Regulatable Risks of Cancer, 35 Emory L. J. 1, 17-22 (1986).
112. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-2671 (West 1982 and Supp. 1992). See also Cynthia Ruggerio, Re-
ferral of Toxic Chemical Regulation under the Toxic Substances Control Act: EPA's Administra-
tive Dumping Ground, 17 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 75 (1989).
113. See Brennan, Narrowing at 110-38 (cited in note 74). See also Richard J. Lazarus, The
Tragedy of Distrust in the Implementation of Federal Environmental Law, 54 L. & Contemp.
Probs. 311, 328-31 (1991) (discussing the failure of a variety of environmental statutes to reach
statutory goals). In sharp contrast with FIFRA and TSCA, the Resource Conservation Recovery
Act, demonstrates a genuine commitment to health-based standards and stringent compliance. See.
42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988). Much of this commitment is attributable to the Hazardous and
Solid Waste Amendments of 1984 (HSWA), Pub. L. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 (1984), which were the
product of a remarkable constellation of political events. By 1984, Congress had become a "reluc-
tant regulator," largely because the Reagan Administration was incompetent in the area of hazard-
ous waste storage. Perhaps the most significant provision of HSWA was the threshold for risk
assessment, set at a level -necessary to protect human health and the environment. See HSWA §
1003(a)(4), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a)(4) (1988). Observers remain of the consensus that
RCRA now demonstrates a dramatic commitment to individual human health and lowest possible
risk. See Walter E. Mugdan and Bruce R. Adler, The 1984 RCRA Amendments: Congress as a
Regulatory Agency, 10 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 215 (1985); William L. Rosbe and Robert L. Gulley,
The Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984: A Dramatic Overhaul of the Way America
Manages Its Hazardous Wastes, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,458 (1984); Janis L. Kirk-
land and James A. Thornhill, Note, Federal and State Remedies to Clean Up Hazardous Waste
Sites, 20 U. Richmond L. Rev. 379 (1986). See also Sidney A. Shapiro and Robert L. Glicksman,
Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Quiet Revolution in Administrative Law, 1988 Duke L. J.
819, 837 (describing HSWA as a dramatic example of prescriptive legislation by Congress).
The judiciary and EPA, however, have undermined the strong language of RCRA in two ways.
First, the judicial interpretation of Section 6924(g)(5) is that it allows undetermined amounts of
toxics to re-enter the environment. See Natural Resources Def. Council v. EPA, 907 F.2d 1146,
1156-58 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Second, EPA has decided to allow a presumption of no pollution migra-
tion upon a showing that an industry has met certain technological requirements. 40 C.F.R. §
264.251 (1990).
In addition, EPA's proposed rules for the corrective action program, which requires older haz-
ardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities (TSDs) to clean up older storage sites,
make repeated references to the use of best demonstrated available technologies (BDAT), 55 Fed.
Reg. 30803 (1990), and to the use of cost considerations in establishing which method of clean-up
that the TSD to use, id. at 30824.
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lack of resources to address such complex issues. Thus, regulators either
move very slowly or opt for incrementalist, technology-based controls
that allow postponement of health assessments.
Toxic pollution persists. Another reason suggests that this will re-
main the case: regulators' political will affects the pace of incremental-
ism. Agency capture can undermine such will, as Krier and Gillette
have discussed in detail.1 " Economic analyses of legislative action and
regulation have lent an academic patina to the notion that regulated
concerns can come to control agencies. 115 Arguably, incrementalism is
more readily captured than is the development of a single, health-based
standard. With the latter, environmental advocates can bring high pro-
file suits against EPA." 6 Incrementalism and the decentralization that
it brings are less subject to central oversight by environmental
advocates.
A corollary to agency capture is executive capture. If the executive
branch can fall into the sway of regulated interests, even an agency that
wishes to push incrementalism can be captured. The Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (OMB)," 7 and now the Council on Competitiveness"18
114. See Gillette and Krier, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1064-68 (cited in note 10).
115. Public choice analysts developed a theory of a legislative market place in which some
accept negative wealth transfers because avoiding the loss of that wealth is not cost-effective.
Thus, any legislation or regulation defines a supply curve with the brokers being bureaucrats, poli-
ticians, and lobbyists. See Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice in Legislation, 74 Va. L. Rev. 379,
342-44 (1988). Given a public choice theory, seeing that effective legislation to control discharge of
toxic pollutants into the environment could be bottled up for over 20 years by various interest
groups is not difficult. Presumably, industries would much more readily and effectively form inter-
est groups than would the injured public. Of course, public choice theories fail to explain how
environmental protection lobbyists can exist, given that their legislative efforts predominantly in-
volve altruistic commitment to a cleaner environment. See Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-
Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 Colum. L.
Rev. 223, 228 (1986).
116. For a discussion of how courts may have tried to curb agency capture by requiring the
agencies to answer environmental interests, see Glicksman and Schroeder, 54 L. & Contemp.
Probs. at 266-68 (cited in note 50).
117. See Robert V. Percival, Checks Without Balance: Executive Oversight of the Environ-
mental Protection Agency, 54 L. & Contemp. Probs. 128 (1991). OMB has interfered in toxic regu-
lation. For example, under Section 1313(c) of the CWA, EPA must propose water quality
standards for states that have not promulgated standards in compliance with the CWA. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1313(c) (1988). EPA sent a final rule for imposing such standards on noncomplying states to
OMB on April 16, 1992, missing a deadline of February 19, 1992 by two months. See OMB Review-
ing Costs of EPA Final Rule to Set Standards for Toxic Pollutants, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 313
(May 15, 1992). As of May 6, OMB had announced that it was concerned about the cost of the
rule, and also indicated that it might recommend that "the criteria for 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-
p-dioxin be excluded from the final toxics package," due to EPA's ongoing reassessment of its
dioxin criteria. Id.
118. See Keith Schneider, Bush to Relax Air Pollution Regulation, N.Y. Times A12 (May 18,
1992) (detailing the victory by the Council on Competitiveness over EPA regarding notification of
public about toxic air pollution). The Clinton administration seems likely to dismantle the Council
on Competitiveness. Environment May Not Top Clinton's List, But Groups See Opportunities 23
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have hampered regulation that they perceive as cost-ineffective, or sim-
ply antibusiness. The conclusion is inescapable: incremental regulatory
approaches to toxic pollution will leave some toxic hot spots. Norma-
tively, legislators and agencies should seek other methods of deterring
such pollution. One obvious candidate is environmental tort litigation.
But before turning there, I examine two other innovative methods for
deterring toxic pollution: markets and criminal sanctions.
IV. OTHER INSTITUTIONAL APPROACHES: THE MARKET AND CRIMINAL
LAW
A central thesis of this Article is that the failure of one institution,
the regulatory apparatus, to control toxic pollution, has created an op-
portunity for another institution, common-law litigation, to address cer-
tain environmental pollution paradigms. It would, however, be
premature to turn to torts without first addressing other potential insti-
tutional sources of deterrence. The most important of these are market
incentives and criminal prosecution of polluters. If, from a normative
perspective, we are to recommend torts as a meaningful source of deter-
rence, the latter institutional responses must be relatively incapable of
taking up the slack left by regulation.
First, consider the market-incentive approach to deterring injuries
caused by pollution. When Congress began to develop comprehensive
environmental statutes in the early 1970s, economists were arguing that
market incentives largely should drive environmental policy.119 In the
mid-1970s, Allen Kneese and Charles Schultz advocated a system under
which a government agency would charge firms for the pollution they
created. 120 The price would equal the amount that people would pay for
a particular level of environmental quality.1 2' In contrast to the stan-
dards of pollution control that would uniformly apply to all sources
throughout the country, charges would allow individual firms to weigh
the costs imposed by their pollution against the costs of alternatives,
such as changes in production or controlled technologies. 2 2 With the
Env't Rep. (BNA) 1758-60 (Nov. 13, 1992).
119. See John Harkness Dales, Pollution, Property and Prices (Univ. of Toronto, 1968); A.
Myrick Freeman, et al., The Economics of Environmental Policy (Wiley, 1973).
120. See Allen V. Kneese and Charles L. Schultz, Pollution, Prices and Public Policy
(Brookings Inst., 1975).
121. Id.
122. Throughout the late 1970s, academics argued forcefully that Congress needed to cus-
tomize environmental statutes as much as possible, especially by applying incentive structures
such as charges and pollution rights that firms could transfer between one another. See generally
Bruce A. Ackerman, et al., The Uncertain Search for Environmental Quality (Free Press, 1974);
James E. Krier, The Irrational National Air Quality Standards: Macro and Micro Mistakes, 22
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 323 (1974); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Market Models for Water Pollution Control:
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1993] ENVIRONMENTAL TORTS 39
"bubble" initiative in the 1980s, under which regional levels of air pol-
lution were established for different airsheds, EPA effectively created
pollution markets by allowing firms to add new sources if a reduction in
an existing source offset the pollution created by the new source.123
Moreover, as Bruce Ackerman and Richard Stewart have suggested,
such markets and pollution rights could lead to more effective control
by congressional policymakers over environmental initiatives. 12
4
In many ways, the turn to overt markets in pollution is unsurpris-
ing. Over the last twenty years, Pareto-superiority and cost-benefit
analyses have motivated much analysis of both the common-law and
administrative-law approaches to pollution.1 2 5 Choices about a particu-
lar regulatory initiative, for instance, can be evaluated in light of the
potential costs and benefits of the program.12 6 The same emphasis on
efficiency is dominant in tort law, including environmental torts. 27
Their Strengths and Weaknesses, 25 Pub. Policy 383 (1977); Thomas H. Tietenberg, Transferable
Discharge Permits and the Control of Stationary Source Air Pollution: A Survey and Synthesis,
56 Land Econ. 391 (1980); Steven Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Re-
strictive Alternatives, and Reform, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 547 (1979); Jorge A. del Calvo y Gonzales,
Markets in Air: Problems and Prospects of Controlled Trading, 5 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 377 (1981).
By the time Professor Stewart had developed a mature theory of incentive structures within regu-
lation, see Richard B. Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A Conceptual
Framework, 69 Cal. L. Rev. 1256 (1981), Congress had passed legislation employing these theories.
123. For excellent discussions of the bubble initiative under the Clean Air Act, see Thomas
H. Tietenberg, Emissions Trading: An Exercise in Reform in Pollution Policy (Johns Hopkins,
1985); Errol Meidinger, The Development of Emissions Trading in U.S. Air Pollution Regulation,
in Keith Hawkins and John M. Thomas, eds., Making Regulatory Policy 153 (U. Pitt., 1989). See
also Richard B. Stewart, Economics, Environment, and the Limits of Legal Control, 9 Harv.
Envtl. L. Rev. 1 (1985). The policy also allows existing sources of pollution in the same state or air
pollution control region to reallocate its pollution control under the state implementation plan
bubble. Long the subject of litigation, the Supreme Court finally gave its approval of the bubble
initiative in 1984. See Chevron USA v. Natural Resources Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
124. See Ackerman and Stewart, 37 Stan. L. Rev. at 1355 (cited in note 8). Presumably,
Congress could specify certain percentile reductions in pollution over a series of years. These re-
ductions would make pollution rights themselves more valuable and the market would adjust ac-
cordingly. The simplicity and efficiency of this notion is attractive, especially since pollution
markets presumably lead to "custom" approaches to particular sources of pollution. Individual
communities exposed to a much higher level of environmental toxins might expect a better
outcome.
125. Pareto-superiority posits that a certain distribution of goods is better than a second
distribution of goods if at least one person prefers the first distribution to the second and the
remaining individuals are indifferent. While attractive as an ideal, the rule obviously has difficul-
ties in practice. Therefore, Kaldor-Hicks models have tended to prove more influential. A Kaldor-
Hicks approach requires that benefits exceed costs, such that those who gain from a project could
compensate the losses of others and still retain accumulated profit. See William M. Landes and
Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law 16-19 (Harvard, 1987).
126. For instance, economists cast decisions to control air pollution in terms of the number
of coal miners' jobs lost, the costs of scrubbers to coal-fired utilities, and the long-term health
impacts of various levels of particulate and sulfur-oxide pollution. See generally Bruce A. Acker-
man and William T. Hassler, Clean Coal, Dirty Air (Yale, 1981).
127. See text accompanying notes 200-10.
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Therefore, use of market incentives to control pollution is merely part
of the overall ascendance of economic reasoning in the law.
Some advocates of a clean environment have however questioned
the virtue of efficiency arguments in environmental law. They argue
that pollution is morally offensive, and polluters should not trade it in a
market context. 2 ' Advocates of such "wide-open spaces" environ-
mentalism posit that a clean earth is good in itself. A clean environment
is not defined by the political structure of any nation; it represents a
more abiding morality. 29 Ecological morality is a theme in environ-
mentalism for those steadfastly opposed to market initiatives.
In a liberal state like our own, market incentives for pollution
abatement are probably more acceptable than ecological morality argu-
ments. 30 Yet, even without embracing an environmental ethic, there is
reason to believe that market incentives may only be effective with re-
spect to nontoxic pollution. Since hazardous pollution by definition
harms human health and even causes death, creating a market in such
128. Sagoff, for instance, argues that efficiency often creates inequality and that the citizen
role should include more than analysis of efficient options in the market. See Mark Sagoff, The
Principles of Federal Pollution Control Law, 71 Minn. L. Rev. 19, 58-59 (1986). For an earlier
discussion of these themes, see Laurence H. Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New
Foundations for Environmental Law, 83 Yale L. J. 1315, 1340-42 (1974).
On another tack, Kelman has opposed market incentives because they fail to carry out the
necessary stigmatization of environmental pollution. He believes that "marking," the moral out-
rage expressed in terms of pollution control, is very important to the society's consideration of
environmental quality. See Steven Kelman, What Price Incentives? Economists and the Environ-
ment 25 (Auburn House, 1981). Kelman also argues that trading some things in the market is
inappropriate. Certain commodities simply cannot be traded, largely because individuals tend to
"down-value" their effect.
129. As Aldo Leopold wrote, "A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stabil-
ity, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong otherwise." See Aldo Leopold, The Land
Ethic, in A Sand County Almanac 240 (Oxford, 1966), quoted in Mark Sagoff, The Economy of
the Earth 154 (Cambridge, 1988). If a person equates concern for the environment with a philoso-
phy of the moral goodness of nature, then a person must be profoundly opposed to a market
approach that allows environmental pollution. Moving from absolutely prohibitory regulation to
trading in pollution rights becomes morally incorrect, because it offends the environment to treat
pollution as fungible. For a discussion of this theory of morality, see Christopher Stone, Earth and
Other Ethics: The Case for Moral Pluralism (Harper & Row, 1987). The notion of an environmen-
tal ethic is rather closely related to the slightly more legal topic of the public trust doctrine. See
National Audubon Soc. v. Superior Ct. of Alpine Cty, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983). See generally
Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Interven-
tion, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 471 (1970).
130. Brennan, Narrowing at 30-38 (cited in note 74). Environmentalists who advocate stig-
matization of pollution presume that the use of the market creates property rights, thus a right to
pollute. These environmentalists seem too respectful of markets. Treating the market, and notions
of property, as forms of regulation in the state, not as absolute rights, is in much more in keeping
with the tenets of liberalism. See, for example, James E. Krier, The (Unlikely) Death of Property,
13 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Policy 75 (1990). Reminding environmentalists that efficiency itself is an
instrumental value, and that markets in pollution are acceptable only insofar as they serve the goal
of a cleaner environment, should allay their concerns.
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pollution rights also creates a market in human lives. Those firms who
face high-cost abatement measures may buy rights to pollute and to
expose individuals to pollution that is harmful to health.' When the
exposed individuals have not been party to the bargain struck by pol-
luters such infringement on the negative freedom of individuals raises
serious concerns.1 3 2
This is not to say that liberalism outlaws commodification of life.
Our laws have long reflected both explicit and implicit valuations of
human lives. Indeed, regulations evince an incredible variation in the
amount we are willing to pay to save human lives. ' 33 The marketplace
also produces such valuations, especially in the form of wage differen-
tials based on the riskiness of an occupation.13 4 Yet in the occupational
setting there is a critical assumption that the employees knowingly con-
sent to risks when they accept a job. That assumption does not usually
exist in the environmental setting. Polluters and polluted typically have
nothing approaching the relationship that exists between employer and
employee. The latter relationship allows at least the fiction of knowl-
edgeable bargaining. The same fiction cannot realistically be main-
tained in the context of pollution. Without notions of consent, the
exposure to toxic pollution infringes too much upon the population's
liberty interest, or negative freedom.
Of course, as discussed above, the difference between toxic and
nontoxic pollution is not sharp. It is disingenuous to say that one would
prohibit the market from trading rights in pollution that hurts peo-
ple. ' 5 For instance, the smog that is part of the Los Angeles basin pro-
posals has significant adverse health effects, yet polluters can trade for
the right to contribute to it. The critical issue seems to be the attributa-
ble fraction of disease, one of the components of toxicity. Smog may
cause respiratory deaths, but it contributes only a small fraction to the
131. Commodification is a liability of instrumental analyses of law. See Margaret Jane Radin,
Market-Inalienability, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 1849, 1860-70 (1987).
132. Liberals believe that individuals should be able to make choices and that the state
should be impartial regarding these choices. Thus liberalism requires an area of noninterference
for the individual, a freedom from interference. See generally Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Lib-
erty (Oxford, 1969).
133. See Clayton Gillette and Wesley Hopkins, Federal Valuation of Human Life: Report to
the Administrative Conference of the United States 2 (Admin. Conf., 1988); John Graham and
James W. Vaupel, Value of Life: What Difference Does It Make?, 6 Risk Analysis 89 (1981); John
F. Morrall III, A Review of the Record, Regulation 25 (Nov./Dec. 1986).
134. See generally W. Kip Viscusi, Risk By Choice (Harvard, 1983); Michael J. Moore and
W. Kip Viscusi, The Quality Adjusted Value of Life, 26 Econ. Inquiry 369 (1988); Michael J.
Moore and W. Kip Viscusi, Doubling the Estimated Value of Life: Results Using New Occupa-
tional and Fatality Data, 7 J. Pol'y Anal. & Mgmt. 476 (1988).
135. Professor Sunstein relies on this too facile dichotomy. See Cass R. Sunstein, Adminis-
trative Substance, 1991 Duke L. J. 607, 635.
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total mortality attributable to respiratory disease. Regulators view
these deaths as "statistical," meaning that specific individual deaths
cannot be linked to exposure to a particular substance. On the other
hand, a toxic substance like arsenic or lead may account for a substan-
tial fraction of certain diseases in a community surrounding a smelter.
The deaths are no longer statistical, but are identifiable." 6 When par-
ticular deaths are linked in this manner to pollution, regulators tend to
fall away from cost-benefit analysis, just as we as a society, do in other
issues in health and safety. 137
Consider the following environmental pollution paradigms. The
first concerns particulate pollution that is concentrated in an urban ba-
sin and is emitted from several industrial sources. The particulate pol-
lution contributes to death from pneumonia, but the attributable
fraction is less than five percent. We might allow trading of pollution
rights without any explicit or implicit consent of the exposed pollution
because we do not readily link the deaths to pollution. Now consider
two smelters that both produce concentrated lead pollution which falls
on surrounding isolated communities. Neurological damage in children
can be traced to these smelters, as the attributable fraction of neurolog-
ical disease caused by lead is high. We are unlikely to allow one smelter
to buy further rights to pollute from the other, because the lives af-
fected are no longer statistical.
In light of these considerations, it is hardly surprising that most
proposals for market-based abatement have centered on nontoxic,
household solid waste,'38 and that integration of market techniques into
regulation have centered on criteria (that is, nontoxic) pollutants. 139
While we may allow unconsented exposure to nuisances, we will not do
so in the case of hazardous pollution. Thus, market proponents in envi-
ronmental law have restricted the use of their techniques to certain par-
adigms of nontoxic pollution.
The other major source of institutional deterrence of environmen-
tal pollution is criminal law. Criminal environmental prosecution is per-
136. Some would say that the smelter "caused" the illness. Everyday discussion of toxicology
closely link the notion of cause with the degree of attributable fraction. See Brennan, 73 Cornell L.
Rev. at 461 (cited in note 34).
137. This phenomenon is especially prominent in medical care where we are willing to under-
take extraordinary expenses to save one life. See Troyen A. Brennan, Just Doctoring: Medical
Ethics in the Liberal State 175-202 (U. Cal., 1991). Impulses to ration care generally do not apply
to an individual patient who could be "rescued." M.E. Levine, Ration or Reserve: The Elderly
Patient in Critical Care, 12 Critical Care Nursing Quarterly 82, 84 (1989).
138. See generally U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, OTA-0-424, Facing
America's Trash: What Next for Solid Municipal Waste? (1959); Richard A. Denison and John
Ruston, eds., Recycling and Incineration: Evaluating the Choices (Island, 1990).
139. See Joel A. Mintz, Economic Reform of Environmental Protection: A Brief Comment
on a Recent Debate, 15 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 149 (1991).
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haps the most exciting area of environmental law today. The federal
government has decided that criminal prosecution is a very efficient
method of bringing about pollution deterrence. 140 For instance, the De-
partment of Justice alone has increased tremendously the number of
criminal environmental cases it has brought in the last five years.'
Critical to the development of environmental criminal prosecution as a
deterrent is the expansion of the scienter and mens rea requirements:'42
courts have proved to be more willing to impute knowledge of violations
to corporate officers. 43 Criminal prosecution has gained such momen-
tum that a backlash has begun, with some commentators advocating a
threshold of moral culpability before prosecution. 144
While the ardor of federal and state prosecutors 45 is admirable,
there is reason to believe that the deterrent effect they produce will
have little impact on the toxic pollution paradigms not affected by reg-
ulation or market influences. First, the law may immunize any federal
facility from governmental prosescution. 46 Much more importantly,
however, criminal prosecutions can only occur once the courts, legisla-
tures, and agencies have defined particular standards of behavior for
those who produce, transport, or store hazardous materials. As noted in
Part III, the major problem in regulation of toxic pollution has been the
inability of regulators to define impermissible levels of pollution. For
instance, in the case of toxic air pollutants, the problem is created by
EPA's inability to produce any standards, not industry's disregard of
government requirements. The government can use criminal law as a
means of deterrence only after the rules are set. For toxic pollution,
society has been unable to set the rules.
140. See F. Henry Habicht II, The Federal Perspective on Environmental Criminal Enforce-
ment: How to Remain on the Civil Side, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10478, 10480 (1987).
141. In 1990, the Department of Justice obtained 134 indictments. Courts returned 78% of
those indictments against corporations and their top officers. See Roger J. Marzulla and Brett G.
Kappel, Nowhere to Run, Nowhere to Hide: Criminal Liability for Violations of Environmental
Statutes in the 1990s, 16 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 201 (1991).
142. See Keith Welks, Corporate Criminal Culpability: An Idea Whose Time Keeps Com-
ing, 16 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 293, 299 (1991); Robert A. Milne, Note, The Mens Rea Requirements of
Federal Environmental Statutes: Strict Criminal Liability in Substance but not Form, 37 Buff. L.
Rev. 307 (1988-89).
143. See, for example, United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741, 743 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 1307 (1991). See also Jane F. Barett and Veronica M. Clarke, Perspectives on the
Knowledge Requirements of Section 6928(d) of RCRA after United States v. Dee, 59 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 862 (1991).
144. See Benjamin S. Sharp, Environmental Enforcement Excesses: Over-Criminalization
and Too Severe Punishment, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,658 (1991); Keith A. Onsdorff
and James N. Mesnard, The Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine in RCRA Criminal Enforce-
ment: What You Don't Know Can Hurt You, 22 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,099 (1992).
145. See Clive I. Morrick, The Mental Culpability Requirements for Proof of Environmental
Crimes in New York, 16 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 253 (1991).
146. See Stephen Herm, Note, Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws on Federal
Facilities, 59 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 938, 940-42 (1991).
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Abject pessimism about criminal prosecution in toxic pollution is
unwarranted, however. The move to technological standards in the
Clean Water Act and now in the Clean Air Act may have a synergistic
effect with criminal prosecution. If EPA sets tight goals for certain
types of industry, and these industries do not meet the goals, criminal
prosecution could prove an important means of ensuring compliance. 147
The integration of criminal prosecution with technological standards
will be an interesting story in environmental law over the next decade.
Nonetheless, the technological standards do not assure the elimination
of particular sources of toxic pollution.148 Therefore, society cannot ex-
pect that criminal prosecution will soon eliminate injuries from hazard-
ous substances.
Regulation, market influences and criminal prosecution all produce
some toxic pollution deterrence. They do not, however, offer much
promise of eliminating the morbidity and mortality associated with this
pollution. This means that injuries will still occur, and that attorneys
will continue to make colorable claims on behalf of plaintiffs. From a
positive viewpoint, environmental tort litigation is likely to continue to
feed off of the reservoir of environmental injuries. From a normative
viewpoint, there is ample need for any deterrence that tort litigation
can muster.
V. THE EVOLUTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL TORTS
I have suggested that regulation fails to eliminate environmental
injuries, and that tort law may provide an institutional answer that ad-
dresses the remaining gaps in public health protection. Normatively,
the deterrent effect of litigation would be welcome; positively, we would
have a functional explanation for the environmental tort litigation that
now exists.
As noted, not all environmental pollution paradigms are viable
sources of attorneys fees, hence torts cannot provide rational deterrence
in all situations.149 When multiple sources of toxic pollution contribute
to a particular risk envelope, rising administrative costs make common-
law litigation unwieldy and inefficient. For instance, lead from automo-
bile emissions may contribute to neurological damage in children. If the
attributable fraction of disease were high enough-that is, if lead was
147. Both the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(c)(1)-(2) (West Supp. 1992), and the
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c) (West Supp. 1992), provide criminal sanctions for violation of
emission standards or discharge of hazardous substances into the environment.
148. See text accompanying notes 70-100.
149. Note, however, that the positive and normative need not align. See notes 10-20 and
accompanying text.
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the major source of a certain type of neurological diseases-then law-
yers might advise plaintiffs to bring environmental tort suits. But a
plaintiff could not possibly sue all the drivers of automobiles in a par-
ticular region or urban area. Instead of suing drivers, attorneys might
try to bring a product liability case against gasoline manufacturers, but
the point remains: when there are an extremely high number of defend-
ants, the aggregation costs are too high for tort litigation to be a realis-
tic and efficient source of deterrence. 5 0
This is not to say that common-law litigation requires a singular
source. The mass product liability cases have shown that while a single
manufacturer is in many ways the best target,'5 ' the courts can, within
reasonable limits, tolerate multiple defendants. 52 In many cases the
market-share theory of liability has eliminated the previously onerous
task of identifying a single defendant. 53 There is, however, a threshold
above which multiplicity of defendants overwhelms torts: the answer to
CFC pollution is not a suit against all users of spray cans and owners of
freon-loaded refrigerators.
The other defining feature of environmental pollution paradigms,
concentration versus dispersion, also defines a barrier to efficient use of
tort litigation. Broadly dispersed pollution, even if quite toxic, creates
150. Ardent supporters of mass tort litigation may argue that current procedure law will ac-
commodate even the broadest mass tort claims. See generally David Rosenberg, The Causal Con-
nection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 Harv. L. Rev.
851, (1984). For a recent discussion that acknowledges the difficulties of collectivization, see Re-
porters' Study at 383-435 (cited in note 7).
151. To illustrate, courts have been able to consolidate the Dalkon Shield litigation and move
it into a hybrid claims facility rather quickly because the A.H. Robbins Company was the only
defendant. See generally Kenneth R. Feinberg, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 53 L. & Con-
temp. Probs. 79, (Autumn 1990).
152. The asbestos suits are a good example of multiple defendants implicated in mass tort.
While plaintiffs have brought a large number of suits, the asbestos litigation has moved slowly
toward the hybrid procedures that can produce anything approaching expedient resolution of
claims. See Marianna S. Smith, Resolving Asbestos Claims: The Manville Personal Injury Settle-
ment Trust, 53 L. & Contemp. Probs. 27 (Autumn 1990). See also Multi-District Panel Transfers
26,639 Cases to Weiner of Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 6 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 257 (1991);
Fireboard Settles Personal Injury Claims Filed by Texas Oil Workers for $185 Million, 6 Toxics
L. Rep. (BNA) 268 (1991); 2,000 New York Plaintiffs Settle Suits for More Than 100 Defendants,
Pay $300 Million, 6 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 1268 (1992). In these kinds of mass torts, courts appar-
ently will not allow each plaintiff his or her day in court no matter what the equity considerations.
See Jack B. Weinstein and Eileen B. Hershenov, The Effect of Equity on Mass Torts Law, 1991 U.
Ill. L. Rev. 269, 285. Hence, careful economic analysis of claims facilities should be a priority. See
Mark A. Peterson, Giving Away Money: Comparative Comments on Claims Resolution Facilities,
53 L. & Contemp. Probs. 113 (Autumn 1990); Ian Ayres, Optimal Pooling in Claims Resolution
Facilities, 53 L. & Contemp. Probs. 159 (Autumn 1990).
153. See Richard Delgado, Beyond Sindell: Relaxation of Cause-in-Fact Rules for Indeter-
minate Plaintiffs, 70 Cal. L. Rev. 881 (1982); Glen 0. Robinson, Multiple Causation in Tort Law:
Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 Va. L. Rev. 713 (1982).
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difficulties in aggregating a cast 54 of litigants. A large risk envelope cre-
ates problems with identification and boundary. Courts have difficulty
identifying epidemiologically the individuals whose disease may be due
to an exposure when the at-risk group is geographically diverse.155 Ad-
ditionally, as the risk envelope spreads out from the source, the risk
decreases as the exposure diminishes. See Figure lb. The outskirts or
boundaries of the risk envelope are very hard to define, making plaintiff
identification difficult.1 56
Plaintiffs in the disperson paradigm encounter identification
problems that do not arise in other mass tort cases. While mass torts
have reached epic proportions, 57 these are typically product cases in
which the plaintiffs worked with, or bought, the product. The risk en-
velope analogy does not apply. Each plaintiff has encountered the prod-
uct in a manner that can be documented. The same documentation is
not possible in environmental torts unless the pollution leaves a resi-
due. 58 Therefore, we would expect environmental torts to provide the
most efficient deterrence where the pollution is concentrated and does
not originate from a large number of sources-the singular-concen-
trated paradigm. In these situations, aggregated plaintiffs can wrestle
with the specific circumstances of hazardous pollution. These situations
are indeed where we tend to find environmental torts. 59
154. I avoid use of the term "class" here because class actions have been so rare in mass tort
litigation. But see Cimino v. Raymarck Indus., Inc. No. B-86-0456 (Dist. Ct. E. Tex. July 9, 1991)
(settling a class action brought by 2300 injured asbestos workers).
155. This may not be a problem in the future; epidemiological methods already have been
proposed for very large scale studies. See S. Tate, et al., Feasibility of an Epidemiologic Study of
Thyroid Neoplasia in Persons Exposed to Radionuclides from the Hanford Nuclear Facility Be-
tween 1944 and 1956, 59 Health Physics 169 (1990) (proposing a study of thyroid cancer in indi-
viduals exposed to plume of radiation from the site up to 200 miles away).
156. The Triana, Alabama DDT litigation is a good example. In 1979, 1200 residents of Tri-
ana filed suit against the Olin Corporation, alleging that Olin had exposed them to DDT dumped
into the Tennessee River. In 1981, these parties settled before trial for about $10,000 per person.
However, over the course of the next two years another 10,000 residents in the area surrounding
Triana filed suit. Francis E. McGovern, The Alabama DDT Settlement Fund, 53 L. & Contemp.
Probs. 61, 62 (Autumn 1990). These consecutive sets of suits indicate the problem with identifying
and aggregating an entire plaintiff class.
157. Jack Weinstein and Eileen Hershenov estimated that there are 175,000 asbestos claim-
ants, 250,000 Agent Orange claimants, and more than 200,000 Dalkon Shield claimants. These
cases constitute only a few of the mass torts now in litigation. See Weinstein and Hershenov, 1991
U. Ill. L. Rev. at 269 (cited in note 152).
,158. A variety of efforts are underway to demonstrate exposure to hazardous substances
through identification of DNA injury. See Troyen A. Brennan, Helping Courts With Toxic Torts,
51 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1, 22 (1989). Another approach is to identify residues of PCB or dioxins in
adipose tissue. Id. at 51. The latter is complicated by the fact that most individuals have some
background level of hazardous substances like DDT or PCB in their adipose tissue. See McGovern,
53 L. & Contemp. Probs. at 64-65 (cited in note 156).
159. See, for example, Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 862 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1988) (groundwater
pollution from one industrial site alleged to have caused cancer in the surrounding population);
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Of course, just because one particular paradigm of environmental
paradigm is theoretically most conducive to tort litigation does not
mean that torts will provide the kind of signals in that paradigm that
regulation, markets and criminal law cannot. As noted, those observers
who question the efficacy of environmental tort litigation have failed to
consider the heterogeneity of environmental pollution paradigms.160 Yet
even in the singular-concentrated pollution paradigm, there remain im-
pressive difficulties that tort doctrine poses for environmental claims.
The litany of obstacles for toxic tort litigants is long, and all are
applicable to environmental tort litigation.' First, the common law's
definition of cause poorly accommodates the epidemiological notion of
risk. Second, long latency periods tend to hamper just resolution of
claims. Third, litigants have a difficult time compiling evidence of negli-
gence. The availability of regulatory compliance defenses further ex-
acerabates this problem. Finally, the environmental tort victim has
little knowledge about, and evidence of, the kinds of chemicals that
plants leak or emit. Even when pollution arises from a singular source,
and the pollution is concentrated, the epidemiological evidence demon-
strates only increased risk, not legal causation. Moreover, the litigant is
unsure of the chemicals to which he or she has been exposed, may dis-
cover the injury only after the statute of limitation has run, and may be
injured even though the plant complied with the (somewhat lax) federal
regulations.
But tort law here, as elsewhere, 162 is changing. Innovative attorneys
are finding ways to overcome the doctrinal barriers. In addition,
Elam v. Alcolac, 765 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (pollution from one industrial site alleged to
cause ill health in surrounding community); Maddy v. Vulcan Materials Co., 737 F. Supp. 1528 (D.
Kan. 1990) (approving settlement between industrial site and neighbors for injuries from alleged
emission and migration of airborne gases); Renaud v. Martin Marietta Corp., 749 F. Supp. 1545
(D. Colo. 1990) (suit by community against Martin Marietta Corporation for groundwater pollu-
tion emitted from industrial site); Vuocolo v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 573 A.2d 196 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (suit by state and local residents against chemical company for releas-
ing dioxin that allegedly caused decedents' cancer); Cook v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 778 F. Supp. 512
(D. Colo. 1991), cited in 6 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 835 (December 11, 1991) (detailing suits at Rocky
Flats Nuclear Plant in which 10,000 plaintiffs are suing for personal injury); MbNeil v. Chevron
Corp., No. 92-00243, (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Jan 15, 1992), cited in 6 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA)
1117 (Feb. 19, 1992) (residents of town file class action against Chevron refinery in wake of acci-
dent that led to emission of hazardous substances).
160. See also Peter S. Menell, The Limitations of Legal Institutions for Addressing Envi-
ronmental Risks, 5 J. Econ. Perspectives 93, 94-101 (1991).
161. For other reasonable discussions of the problems faced by potential environmental tort
litigants, see Howard Latin, Activity Levels, Due Care, and Selective Realism in Economic Analy-
sis of Tort Law, 39 Rutgers L. Rev. 487, 491 (1987). Gillette and Krier have categorized problems
for litigants in terms of process and access bias. Gillette and Krier, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1046-60.
The identification of paradigms of pollution eliminates some access and some process barriers.
Others remain, and are discussed in this Part.
162. See Elliott, 43 Rutgers L. Rev. at 1070 (cited in note 7).
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changes in statutory law complement the developments in the common
law. As environmental tort litigation evolves, understanding and
describing the changes that enable more successful claims is central to a
positive theory of environmental torts. These changes can be classified
as: decreasing entry barriers (overcoming statute of limitations and low-
ering information costs); addressing causation problems (probabilistic
causation and medical monitoring reforms); and easing liability stan-
dards (prohibiting regulatory compliance defense and endorsing strict
liability as opposed to negligence).
Innovations in environmental torts also have normative implica-
tions, as increased litigation presumably affects deterrence. But more
litigation does not necessarily contribute efficient and rational deter-
rence. Indeed, as discussed in the introduction, litigation may not pro-
duce deterrence at all. It may only overdeter, leading to inefficient
enterprise activity.163 Therefore, while describing the evolution of envi-
ronmental torts, we should conjecture how the changes might modify
deterrence, realizing that we have little empirical evidence with which
to assess any hypotheses.
A. Reducing Entry Barriers
1. Decreasing Information Costs
The ignorance of plaintiffs and their attorneys about the nature of
pollution produced by industry is a major impediment to litigation.
However, a number of statutory enactments are now providing informa-
tion on toxic exposures for residents surrounding particular sources.
Among these innovative statutory measures are the Comprehensive
Environmental Response Compensation and Liability
Act 6 4 (CERCLA), and various right-to-know provisions associated with
a number of federal and state laws. CERCLA, also known as
Superfund, has become perhaps the most prominent federal environ-
mental statute. Its primary function is to ameliorate hazardous waste
sites. It differs from other vast congressional environmental initiatives
in that it utilizes a number of common-law doctrines, including strict,
joint and several, and retroactive liability, to shift burdens to individu-
als who have contributed to a hazardous waste site.'6 5
163. Overdeterrence seems doubtful given the relative lack of deterrence provided by other
institutions.
164. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980), codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
165. The literature on CERCLA is nearly as vast as the litigation that it has prompted. For a
good discussion of the litigation under CERCLA, see Jones and McSlarrow.... But Were Afraid
to Ask: Superfund Case Law 1981-1989, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,430 (1989). See also
John C. Buckley, Reducing the Environmental Impact of CERCLA, 41 S.C. L. Rev. 765 (1990);
Jeff Civins, Environmental Law Concerns in Real Estate Transactions, 43 Sw. L. J. 819 (1990).
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For purposes of this Article, Superfund's synergistic effect on indi-
vidual citizens' litigation is critical.16 6 In the Superfund Amendment
and Re-Authorization Act of 1986 (SARA), 167 Congress mandated that
EPA develop lists of hazardous substances that pose the greatest
threats at hazardous waste sites and compile profiles of each of these
substances regarding their toxicological principles.'6 8 SARA also re-
quired the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR)
to produce new health assessments at particular Superfund National
Priority List (NPL) sites. '69 These studies were to entail an analysis of
the risk that the hazardous substances at the site posed to humans as
well as specific information on exposure and contamination.'7 0 Citizens
can obtain the health assessments at specific sites.1'7 Moreover, new
Section 117 of SARA made funds available that exposed individuals
may use to obtain technical assistance regarding hazardous substance
Several excellent discussions of the mechanics of CERCLA are available. See generally Jan Paul
Acton, Understanding Superfund: Progress Report (Rand 1989); Office of Technology Assessment,
Coming Clean: Superfund Problems Can Be Solved (OTA, 1989) (hereinafter "Coming Clean"].
The clean-up task is proceeding slowly. At this time, of 1175 national priority list sites, only 34
have had site work completed. Moreover, only 177 are in the critical remedial action stage. See
Acton, Understanding Super!und at 27. Many believe that rather than 1200 or 1300 NPL sites,
over 10,000 such sites will eventually be listed on the NPL. See Coming Clean at 7.
166. Courts have recognized that under Section 107 of CERCLA individual private parties,
in addition to the United States, can sue for clean-up costs. See Ascon Properties Inc. v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 866 F.2d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 1989); Kalick v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 658 F. Supp. 631, 637
(W.D. Pa. 1987). See generally James L. Rogers and Eugene C. McCall, The Private Plaintiff's
Prima Facie Case Under CERCLA Section 107, 41 S.C. L. Rev. 833 (1990).
Private citizens, however, made little use of this provision from 1980 through 1986. Perhaps in
recognition of this, Congress added an explicit citizen suit provision to CERCLA in the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA). SARA § 1-9, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat.
1612, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9659 (1988). The new provision allowed suits by private citizens
against those who violate CERCLA requirements as well as against the federal government for
failing to undertake nondiscretionary duties. Id. Some, however, feel that the citizen suit provi-
sions will do little to change the course or scope of CERCLA. See Jeffrey M. Gaba and Mary E.
Kelly, The Citizen Suit Provision of CERCLA: A Sheep in Wolf's Clothing?, 43 Sw. L. J. 929
(1990). Moreover, SARA's restrictions on the timing of suits will no doubt crimp citizen litigation.
In general, SARA was another example of a mid-1980s effort by Congress to increase the speed
and viability of EPA's enforcement by creating specific deadlines and mandating initiatives. See
generally Timothy B. Atkeson, et al., An Annotated Legislative History of the Superfund Amend-
ments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,360 (1987).
167. The original CERCLA legislation created the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease
Registry (ATSDR) within the Department of Health and Human Services. CERCLA required
ATSDR to act as a central repository for investigations of health effects of hazardous substances,
to conduct studies at hazardous waste sites, and to develop a registry of individuals who were
exposed to hazardous substances. This work proceeded very slowly. As a result Congress, acting
through SARA, created specific duties and time tables for the ATSDR. Id. at 10375.
168. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(i)(2), (i)(3).
169. Id. § 9604(i)(6)(A) (1988).
170. Id. § 9604(i)(6).
171. Id. § 9604(i)(6)(B).
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assessment. 1 2 Finally, SARA created a new federal standard that would
toll state statute-of-limitation periods at "the date the plaintiff knew or
reasonably should have known that the personal injury... [was] caused
or contributed to by the hazardous substance or pollutant or contami-
nant concerned."17 3
The information available from the ATSDR considerably lightens
the burden on common-law litigants injured by hazardous wastes. In
effect, the ATSDR develops the data on causation that formerly would
have been compiled by the plaintiffs, a very onerous task. Moreover, the
ATSDR will provide specific information on exposure and contamina-
tion that was previously unavailable. ATSDR grants constitute the fi-
nancial basis for a common-law case. Perhaps most importantly, the
ATSDR information is presumably objective and nonpartisan. 1 4 Such
compilation of causation and exposure information by an impartial
body should enable plaintiffs and their attorneys to make more rational
decisions about the merit of potential claims.175
The burgeoning of right-to-know statutes under both federal and
state law is another development that increases the availability of infor-
172. Id. § 9617(e)(1), (e)(2). The amount available under this program may exceed $50,000.
Id.
173. Id. § 9658(a)(1). In order to fill the gaps in existing knowledge, CERCLA also empowers
ATSDR to provide grants for research on specific substances. See id. § 9604(i)(5). Primary respon-
sible parties and registrants under TSCA and FIFRA are to bear the costs of these assessments. Id.
§ 9604(i)(5)(D).
174. See Brennan, 51 U. Pitt. L. Rev. at 44 (cited in note 158).
175. It is too early to tell whether or not this sunny prospect will bear out. At least one very
prominent environmental tort case, In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 706 F. Supp. 358 (E.D.
Pa. 1988) (granting defendant's motion for summary judgment), rev'd, 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990),
focused in part on an ATSDR study at the site, as well as ATSDR documents concerning the
toxicity of PCBs. Defendant's summary judgment motion, which had been granted by the District
Court, was overturned on Circuit Court review. At both the trial and appellate level, the ATSDR
information played a prominent role. See 706 F. Supp. at 370-78; 916 F.2d at 847.
Unsurprisingly, courts increasingly intermingle Superfund litigation with environmental tort
claims. Such cases have forced federal courts to consider the comparative roles of statutory (that
is, CERCLA) and common law in the design of remedies for those exposed to hazardous wastes.
For instance, plaintiffs have sought medical monitoring remedies as response costs under
CERCLA. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B). Some courts have allowed medical monitoring costs
under Section 107(a)(4)(B). See, for example, Brewer v. Ravan, 680 F. Supp. 1176 (M.D. Tenn.
1988); Williams v. Allied Automotive, Autolite Div., 704 F. Supp. 782 (N.D. Ohio 1988); Lykins v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 27 Envtl. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1590, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
21,498 (E.D. Ky. 1988). Others have refused, noting that the state's common law allows such
claims. They reason that in these states tort law is the proper vehicle for medical monitoring. The
most thorough discussion of this issue is in Ambrogi v. Gould, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1233, 1246-50
(M.D. Pa. 1990). For further discussion, see In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litigation, 780 F.
Supp. 1551 (E.D. Wash. 1991); Woodman v. United States, 764 F. Supp. 1467 (M.D. Fla. 1991);
Keister v. Vertac Chem. Corp., 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,677 (E.D. Ark. 1990); Werlein
v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 887 (D. Minn. 1990). While these innovations apply only to
Superfund sites, they nonetheless exhibit a judicial willingness to consider carefully the appropri-
ate roles of torts and statutory provisions.
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mation on hazardous substances in the environment and, presumably
lowers the barrier to tort litigation.17 6 While the most prominent right-
to-know law primarily affects occupational safety and health issues,
the passage of Title III of SARA,1 78 known as the Emergency Planning
and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA), created hazard-
warning duties for companies that release environmental toxins.179
While acknowledging that problems in enforcement of EPCRA exist,
most commentators nonetheless agree that the reporting requirements
176. Kip Viscusi has argued for the efficiency advantages of greater information regarding
hazards in the work place, and presumably elsewhere, when linked to individual choice about risks.
See W. Kip Viscusi, Risks By Choice: Regulating Health and Safety in the Work Place, Chs. 7-9
(Harvard, 1983). Moreover, hazard communication clearly fits the liberal state's insistence on per-
sonal choice and individual liberties. Therefore, hazard communication would seem to be an inte-
gral part of any liberal approach to toxic substances in the environment. Not all would agree.
Producers would prefer to avoid imposition of liability and loss of trade secrets. See Paulette L.
Stenzel, The Need for A National Risk Assessment Communication Policy, 11 Harv. Envtl. L.
Rev. 381 (1987); Nicholas Ashford and Charles Caldart, The Right-to-Know: Toxics Information
Transfer in the Work Place, 6 Ann. Rev. Pub. Health 383 (1985) (dismissing the privacy concerns
that producers may have).
177. The first of the federal right-to-know regulations was OSHA's Hazard Communication
Standard (HCS). The HCS requires that manufacturers decide whether or not a workplace chemi-
cal is a health hazard. If it is, then the manufacturer must comply with extensive labeling and
reporting rules. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1987). The manufacturer must append a warning label
to any hazardous ingredient unless it is a trade secret. Id. § 1910.1200(h)(1)(i)(1). The manufac-
turer must then incorporate these warnings into a material safety data sheet that details the na-
ture of the hazards presented by the chemicals as well as the steps to take should any exposure
occur. Id. § 1910.1200(g). Some have criticized the amount of discretion granted to manufacturers
under the OSHA rule. See Susan D. Carle, Note, A Hazardous Mix: Discretion to Disclose and
Incentives to Suppress Under OSHA's Hazard Communication Standard, 97 Yale L. J. 581
(1988).
Courts have interpreted the OSHA standard to preempt more stringent state right-to-know
statutes. See, for example, Ohio Mfrs. Ass'n v. City of Akron, 801 F.2d 824 (6th Cir. 1986); New
Jersey State Chamber of Comm. v. Hughey, 774 F.2d 587 (3d Cir. 1985). See also James T.
O'Reilly, Driving a Soft Bargain: Unions, Toxic Materials and Right To Know Legislation, 9
Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 307, 309 n.13 (1985) (listing state right-to-know statutes). Some have argued
that from an economic point of view, such preemption is ill-advised. See, for example, Elinor P.
Schroeder and Sidney A. Shapiro, Responses to Occupational Disease: The Role of Markets, Reg-
ulation and Information, 72 Georgetown L. J. 1231 (1984).
A good deal of on-going litigation regarding the scope of the HCS still exists. See Dole v.
United Steel Workers of Am., 494 U.S. 26 (1990); Mark L. Goldstein, Hazard Communication in
the Work Place, 7 Hofstra Labor L. J. 303 (1990).
178. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1729 (1986), codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (1988).
179. EPCRA has three parts. Subtitle A details a structure of state and local emergency
response planning communities and requires the promulgation of emergency response plans, 42
U.S.C. §§ 11001-11005 (1988). Subtitle B spells out the requirements for reporting by facilities
where hazardous substances are manufactured or stored. Id. §§ 11021-11023. Subtitle C sets forth
enforcement, citizens suit, and trade secret provisions. Id. §§ 11041-11050. Congress did not intend
for EPCRA to preempt more stringent state requirements, and some avenues of state and federal
cooperation seem available. See Robert Abrams and Douglas H. Ward, Prospects for Safer Com-
munities: Emergency Response, Community Right To Know and Prevention of Chemical Acci-
dents, 14 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 135, 152 (1990) (noting the states that have recently adopted laws
improving EPCRA's existing provisions and establishing prevention planning).
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will make more information available for tort litigants. 80 Producers
now recognize that local citizens will be increasingly aware of the
hazards produced and used at industrial sites. This knowledge may de-
ter cavalier use and disposal of hazardous substances, since information
on exposure to hazardous chemicals could galvanize the community of
people living around a particular facility. For potential environmental
tort claims, the plaintiff's knowledge about exposure and the potential
injuries associated with that exposure creates the possibility that plain-
tiffs may negotiate a reasonably efficient settlement with a producer.
This could also serve as a rational deterrence signal.'"
In addition to the federal right-to-know laws, several state initia-
tives are notable.' 2 Foremost among these is Proposition 65, Califor-
nia's Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act.18 3 Approved by
sixty-two percent of California voters in 1986, Proposition 65 requires
the state government to publish a list of chemicals known to be carcino-
genic or teratogenic, forces businesses to warn those who may be ex-
posed to a listed chemical, and prohibits discharge of such chemicals
into drinking water.8 4 The state already has listed certain chemicals as
carcinogens8 5 and has brought a good deal of enforcement litigation for
failure to warn. 86 Interestingly, Proposition 65 puts the burden on the
180. See Michael Baram, et al., Managing Chemical Risks: Corporate Response to SARA
Title III 10-12 (Tufts, 1990); Michael D. Green, When Toxic Worlds Collide: Regulatory and
Common Law Prescriptions for Risk Communication, 13 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 209, 224-231 (1989).
Indeed, Green discusses the interrelationships of EPCRA and tort suits in some detail and notes
the impact that EPCRA warnings may have on statutes of limitations definitions under SARA. Id.
at 225-226.
181. See Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. Legal Stud.
357, 360 (1984) (noting that for a tort to play an important deterrent role, equality of information
must exist between plaintiff and defendant). Along these lines, Congress seemingly could design
the right-to-know laws with particular incentives for producers to provide useful information. See
Mary L. Lyndon, Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing Laws to Produce and
Use Data, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 1795 (1989). Congress has incorporated right-to-know provisions incor-
porated into numerous federal statutes. See, for example, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2607, 2613 (1988) (TSCA); 7
U.S.C. §§ 136h(d), 136s (1988) (FIFRA).
182. See, for example, Sharon A. Treat, The New Jersey Right To Know Act, 38 Rutgers L.
Rev. 755 (1986) (reviewing the New Jersey Worker and Community Right To Know Act, N.J. Stat.
Ann. §§ 34:5A-1-31 (West Supp. 1986)).
183. See Cal. Health and Safety Code §§ 25180.7, 25189.5, 25192, 25249.5-.13 (West Supp.
1988).
184. See generally Judith A. DeFranco, California's Toxics Initiative: Making It Work, 39
Hastings L. J. 1195 (1988); Melinda Haag, Proposition 65's Right To Know Provision: Can It Keep
Its Promise to California Voters?, 14 Ecol. L. Q. 685 (1987).
185. See William S. Pease, et al., Risk Assessment for Carcinogens Under California's Pro-
position 65, 10 Risk Analysis 255, 255 (1990) (noting that 333 chemicals or chemical mixtures are
included on the governor's list as carcinogens).
186. See, for example, State Files Proposition 65 Law Suits Against Firms for Ethylene
Oxide Emissions, Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 545 (July 27, 1990).
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discharger of chemicals to show that the chemical itself poses no signifi-
cant risk of human disease.187
The information-creating aspects of SARA, and the state and fed-
eral right-to-know statutes bespeak a much different approach to envi-
ronmental problems than would have been contemplated fifteen years
ago.'88 Before the Benzene decision and the failure of the generic cancer
policies of OSHA and EPA, there was a certain optimism about com-
prehensive regulation of hazardous substances. In the post-Benzene pe-
riod, Congress and the states appeared to be more interested in
reiterating individual's rights, especially by giving them more informa-
tion on chemical exposure. These innovative regulations should increase
litigation, which at least promises rational deterrence.' 89 SARA and
right-to-know statutes encourage environmental tort litigants by pro-
viding them with low cost information. 190 Citizens living near a concen-
187. See Cal. Health and Safety Code § 25249.10(c) (West Supp. 1988).
188. The Clean Water Act also contains right-to-know provisions. See 33 U.S.C. § 1318(v)
(1988). This section of the CWA authorizes the EPA to require permit-holders to keep records and
report of hazardous wastes going into surface water, and to afford the public access to this
information.
189. Of course, the failure of Big Green-the California initiative that would have phased out
the use of carcinogenic or teratogenic pesticides, prohibited the sale of food containing pesticides,
mandated establishment of purely health-based tolerance for food and set stringent health-based
standards for discharge of toxic pollutants into state waters-indicates that citizens may not be
ready to give up on cost-benefit analysis. See generally Gregory J. Mertz, Dead But Not Forgotten:
California's Big Green Initiative, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 506 (1992). Costly regulations, or at least
those to which society can affix a clear price tag and that go beyond mere empowering of individu-
als regarding the level of their exposure, may not be part of the future in state environmental
initiatives. See also S.H. Verhovek, Albany Looks Longingly at Land It Can't Buy, N.Y. Times E6
(Nov. 25, 1990) (detailing demise of New York's expensive Environmental Quality Bond Act).
190. Right-to-know statutes and environmental tort litigation can be seen as part of a
"greening" of environmental law, a movement to citizen-based litigation from reliance on compre-
hensive rational regulation. Another aspect of greening is the recent increase in citizen suits under
various environmental statutes. Most of the major environmental statutes long have allowed indi-
viduals to act as private attorneys general. See generally Robert F. Blomquist, Rethinking the
Citizen as Prosecutor: Model of Environmental Enforcement Under the Clean Water Act, 22 Ga.
L. Rev. 337 (1988); Barry Boyer and Errol Meidinger, Note, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement:
A Preliminary Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 Buff. L. Rev.
833 (1985). Since the mid-1980s, the number of citizen suits filed under either the Clean Water Act
or the Clean Air Act have increased significantly. See Jeannette L. Austin, Comment, The Rise of
Citizen-Suit Enforcement in Environmental Law: Reconciling Private and Public Attorneys Gen-
eral, 81 Nw. U. L. Rev. 220, 221-22 (1987).
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's introduction of a number of obstacles to citizen suits
under the Clean Water Act in Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49 (1987), and aca-
demic concerns about the interference of private rights with public programs, see Richard B. Stew-
art and Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1193 (1982),
citizen suits activity continues unabated, see, for example, Carr v. Alta-Verde Indus., Inc., 931
F.2d 1055 (5th Cir. 1991); Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 897 F.2d 1128 (11th
Cir. 1990).
Increasing citizen awareness and citizen participation in regulation-enforcement, however, will
probably not lead to a radical restructuring of environmental law. Some scholars believe otherwise.
See, for example, James Paul Kimmel, Comment, Disclosing the Environmental Impact of Human
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trated, singular site increasingly have tools available to learn about
their- exposure to hazardous chemicals.
2. Changing Statutes of Limitation
Statutes of limitation establish a limit of two to four years, depend-
ing on applicable state law, from the time that the cause of action "ac-
crued" for a plaintiff to file a claim. Courts conventionally find that an
action has accrued once the defendant has acted wrongfully and
thereby caused injury to the victim. That interpretation occasions no
particular difficulties when the harm done is immediately visible, such
as a motor vehicle accident or a plane crash. However, the diseases that
follow toxic exposures-most notably, though by no means solely, can-
cers-typically have latency periods between the original exposure and
the ultimate manifestation of the disease, the latter being the time
when the victim realizes the need to seek redress for the harm done.
Without some qualifications to the conventional understanding of "ac-
crual," the vast majority of environmental injury claims could never
even be filed.
Fortunately, the courts have responded to this problem. Their re-
sponse was heavily influenced by a Supreme Court ruling in 1949 that
under the Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA), the limitation pe-
riod did not begin to run until the individual employee had discovered
the silicosis inflicted by long-term exposure to silica dust on the job.19'
By now, approximately forty states have explicitly adopted some form
of this "discovery rule.' '19 2
Courts need to interpret the discovery principle carefully and gen-
erously in order to ameliorate the effect of standard limitation periods
on environmental exposure cases. A person who lives near a hazardous
waste site may learn that she has developed leukemia, for example, but
may not connect her disease with exposure to the waste site for some
time thereafter. The victim may be unaware of the presence of the
waste site in the area, or the scientific community may be unaware of
the connection between this type of exposure and disease. The courts
have developed a variety of doctrinal formulae that give plaintiffs some
latitude in discerning the causal connection between their current ill-
Activities: How A Federal Pollution Control Program Based on Individual Decision-Making and
Consumer Demand Might Accomplish the Environmental Goals of the 1970s in the 1990s, 138 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 505 (1989) (sketching the outlines of a consumer, market-based approach to environ-
mental regulation. Kimmel's notion of an environmental impact index, while useful in many ways,
cannot be taken as a serious alternative to command-and-control regulation. This Article offers the
tort system as a complement to environmental regulation, not in any way as an alternative.
191. See Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949).
192. See Developments-Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1458, 1605-06 (1986).
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ness and the defendant's prior activity.193 However, even forty years af-
ter the emergence of the "discovery" principle, the statute of limitation
has been one of the most successful defenses regularly asserted in as-
bestos litigation.1 9 4
Scholars have conducted vigorous debate over the last several years
about the pros and cons of statutory limitation periods, particularly in
the toxic tort area. Some scholars advocate the enactment of ten- or
twenty-year statutes of repose. These statutes would remove from en-
terprises any specter of liability for a multiplicity of later-discovered
tort suits, including suits that may turn on lost or stale evidence of the
initial exposures. 19 5 Others have argued, persuasively, that avoiding
such rigid statutes of repose and adopting a relaxed interpretation of
when "discovery" occurs better serves the substantive goals of tort law
in the environmental area.19 6
The Superfund Section 301(e) Study Group proposed, and the
Congress enacted in SARA, a mandatory federal standard governing
when state limitation periods may begin for purposes of any personal
injury actions "caused or contributed to by exposure to any hazardous
substance, or pollutant or contaminant, released into the environment
from a facility."'197 The federal trigger is the "date the plaintiff knew (or
reasonably should have known) that the personal injury . . . [was]
caused or contributed to by the hazardous substance or pollutant or
contaminant concerned."' 98 This new federal standard provided a rea-
sonable balance between the interests of enterprises and victims. This
balance will permit the vast bulk of legitimate environmental tort
claims to proceed, while still providing some legal spur to victims to file
their claims as soon as they could reasonably know about them. 9 From
193. Compare Larsen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 399 N.W.2d 1 (Mich. 1986) (holding
that time starts running from manifestation of disease itself) with Zeleznik v. United States, 770
F.2d 20 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that time starts from discovery of the immediate cause of injury)
and Rose v. A.C.& S., Inc., 796 F.2d 294 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that time starts when the defend-
ant's own involvement becomes known).
194. See Michael D. Green, The Paradox of Statutes of Limitations in Toxic Substance
Litigation, 76 Cal. L. Rev. 1965, 1969-70 (1988).
195. See Richard A. Epstein, The Temporal Dimension in Tort Law, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175
(1986). On statutes of repose generally, see Francis E. McGovern, The Variety, Policy and Consti-
tutionality of Product Liability Statutes of Repose, 30 Am. U. L. Rev. 579 (1981).
196. See Green, 76 Cal. L. Rev. at 1970 (cited in note 194) (arguing that Congress should
abolish statutes of limitation in toxic tort litigation).
197. 42 U.S.C. § 9658(a)(1)(1988).
198. Id. § 9658(b)(4)(A) (1992) (referring to provisions outlined in 42 U.S.C. §§ 9658(a)(1)),
9658(b)(4)(B)).
199. In those legal settings where the federal statute does not apply of its own accord, the
common-law discovery principle should be developed along these same lines. See, for example,
Covalt v. Carey Canada, Inc., 860 F.2d 1434 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that CERCLA does not apply
to an occupational disease claim against the manufacturer of asbestos because courts cannot con-
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a normative viewpoint, it seems commendable. On the positive side,
tort law clearly has evolved to ensure that friction between latency peri-
ods and statutes of limitation does not obstruct reasonable claims.
B. Changing Liability Standards
1. Regulatory Compliance
Much of this Article is devoted to an examination of environmental
torts, and the deterrence they-may produce, as a complement to regula-
tory policy. If, however, defendants can use compliance with lax regula-
tions as a defense, environmental tort litigation will flounder. Moreover,
if regulation efficiently prevents environmental injuries through ex ante
rules, a proposition that seems doubtful in the area of environmental
toxic injury, tort litigation becomes an unwelcome producer of
overdeterrence. Thus, the use of a regulatory compliance defense is cen-
tral to both positive and normative descriptions of environmental torts:
the former because a regulatory compliance defense will inhibit litiga-
tion, the latter because of the centrality of complementary deterrence
to the usefulness of common-law litigation of environmental injuries.
Scholars have discussed rather widely the relative theoretical bene-
fits of the common-law for accident prevention vis-A-vis regulation.200
Steven Shavell likely has done the best conceptual analysis.201 He con-
cludes that when an injurer's knowledge about risk is greater than that
of regulators or other authorities, when information is needed from the
injured about the nature of their harm, and when the injured's assets
are not too small, liability seems superior to state initiatives. 202 In light
of the poor performance of regulations in developing information, the
multiplicity and heterogeneity of sites of toxic pollution, the knowledge
inequity between regulators and injurers (Shavell's first condition) ar-
guably persists even given the growing influence of right-to-know stat-
sider the interior of a place of employment the "environment" for purposes of CERCLA).
200. Some have advocated much greater use of regulatory initiatives. See generally E. Donald
Elliott, Goal Analysis versus Institutional Analysis of Toxic Compensation Systems, 73 Ge-
orgetown L. J. 1357 (1985); W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a Diminished Role for Tort Liability: Social
Insurance, Government Regulation, and the Contemporary Risks to Health and Safety, 6 Yale J.
Reg. 65 (1989). Others are committed to common-law litigation and to court assessment of risks.
See generally Clayton P. Gillette and James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1027 (1990); Guido Calabresi, Torts-The Law of the Mixed Society, 56 Tex. L. Rev. 519
(1978). Scholars are unlikely to resolve this debate without significant empirical research. See text
accompanying notes 14-18. See generally Donald Dewees, Tort Law and the Deterrence of Envi-
ronmental Pollution, in T.H. Tietenberg, ed. Innovation in Environmental Policy 139 (Elgar,
1992); Lewis A. Kornhauser and Richard L. Revesz, Apportioning Damages Among Potentially
Insolvent Actors, 19 J. Legal Stud. 617, 651 (1990) (planning new analyses of regulation versus tort
litigation).
201. See Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law 277-86 (Harvard, 1987).
202. Id. at 286.
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utes. Information about injuries is definitely needed from injured
parties (Shavell's second condition).
The third condition is really a matter of payment of the costs of
litigation. If plaintiffs' attorneys are willing to take cases either because
of the aggregative value of claims, or because of some sense of altruistic
commitment to compensation for injury, then the individual plaintiff's
assets are not so important. Therefore, with regard to Shavell's condi-
tions, liability is theoretically attractive and a regulatory compliance
defense should not displace it.20 This has certainly been the posture of
common-law courts, which have traditionally resisted finding a defend-
ant's adherence to regulations to exculpate them from liability.20 4 Tort
litigation has proceeded independently of regulation and with the im-
plicit assumption that any deterrence it produces is complementary.
Advocates of tort reform, especially in the area of product liability,
have begun to reassess the assumption of complementary deterrence. 20 5
Overdeterrence is a theoretical probability, although, as elsewhere, no
empirical evidence is available.20 Nonetheless, fears of tort crisis have
led to state laws that preclude punitive damages in drug product liabil-
ity cases, 20 7 to the SARA provisions that shield cleanup activities, 20 8
and to a few federal court decisions that overtly accept a compliance
defense. 0 9
The merits of a regulatory compliance defense must depend some-
what on the role played by torts and regulation in a given area of acci-
dent law. For instance, ex ante regulation through a culling statute,21 0
which requires proof of safety before marketing can begin, might be so
potent that allowing ex post tort litigation would decrease enterprise
levels without accomplishing more safety. Thus in drug product liabil-
ity, the FDA's oversight of the introduction of new products generates
real deterrence, and suggests that further tort litigation might amount
to overdeterrence (especially in the case of punitive damages). On the
other hand, culling statutes that are weakly enforced do not provide the
203. As Shavell notes, a mixture of safety regulation and liability, specifically minimal safety
standards and a threat of liability, is perhaps the optimal situation from a deterrence viewpoint.
Id. at 288.
204. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288C (1965).
205. See generally Paul Dueffert, Note, The Role of Regulatory Compliance in Tort Actions,
26 Harv. J. Leg. 175 (1989).
206. See, for example, Viscusi, 6 Yale J. Reg. at 68 (cited in note 200). The ALI Report
report on enterprise liability also cites administrative costs. See Reporters' Study at 88-91 (cited in
note 7). Both authorities note that little empirical work on the subject exists.
207. Reporter's Study at 77-83 (Chapter 16, Regulatory Compliance).
208. 42 U.S.C. § 9619 (1988) (CERCLA § 119).
209. See, for example, Jefferson County School Dist. R-1 v. Gilbert, 725 F.2d 774 (Colo.
1987) (finding city not liable for intersection design if it complied with federal regulations).
210. See Brennan, Narrowing at 68 (cited in note 74).
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same foundation for a compliance defense. Or if a regulatory scheme is
poorly devised and leaves specific holes in the safety net it is designed
to create, then regulatory standards should not exculpate defendants.
The perception that regulatory control of toxic pollution has been in-
complete, and the possibility of efficient deterrence from tort litigation
at some sites suggests that the availability of a regulatory compliance
defense should be limited, at least for now.
Regarding the positive description of environmental torts, it seems
the judicial animosity must be limiting its utility of the regulatory com-
pliance defense.21' Nonetheless, the defense will continue to arise, espe-
cially as environmental torts intermingle with litigation under statutory
provisions such as Superfund. The weight of regulatory compliance is
likely to become a salient issue as judges become cognizant of the paral-
lel intentions of environmental statutory law and torts.
2. Strict Liability
The other critical liability issue in environmental torts is the choice
of a negligence or strict liability standard in environmental litigation.
Environmental litigants could face a negligence standard, courts being
unwilling to accept that environmental pollution is an unduly danger-
ous and inappropriate undertaking.212 The plaintiff must then prove
substandard care by the polluter. Given a certain latency period be-
tween exposure and discovery of injury, much of the necessary evidence
of negligence might be cold or unavailable to a plaintiff by the time of
the lawsuit. This is a tremendous burden for potential litigants.
Of course, courts can opt for strict liability. Strict liability enables
a court to identify the best preventor of injury and to affix liability.213
211. I have been unable to find an environmental tort case where a regulatory compliance
defense was successful.
212. See W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 78 at 547-48
(West, 5th ed. 1984) (commenting on Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868)).
213. See Guido Calabresi and Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts,
81 Yale L. J. 1055, 1060 (1972). As Komesar points out, Calabresi's analysis is most justified when
accidents are highly preventable, such that the avoided costs outweigh the problems with over-
insurance created by the strict liability standard. See Komesar, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 73 (cited in
note 10).
Shavell's more technical consideration of the issue buttresses Calabresi's functional analysis.
See generally Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law at 5-83 (cited in note 201). Shavell
factors in the interaction of the plaintiff's and defendant's knowledge as well as each player's rela-
tive carefulness, and concludes that courts should prefer strict liability in situations analogous to
environmental torts. Shavell's paradigm is the health risks posed by microwave ovens. He notes
that strict liability is preferable when (i) an individual has imperfect knowledge of the substantial
health risks associated with such products, (ii) courts have difficulty ascertaining the possibilities
of designing safe microwave ovens and (iii) there is very little contributory negligence by users. Id.
at 57-58. Kornhauser and Revesz draw similar conclusions regarding the use of strict liability in
CERCLA. See Lewis A. Kornhauser and Richard Revesz, Sequential Decisions by a Single
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This analysis depends heavily on the assumption that the parties, espe-
cially the defendant, have greater information than do courts. 1 While
this may not be true in other areas of tort litigation, it seems a reasona-
ble assumption in environmental torts. Courts, and presumably regula-
tors, may be uncertain as to how to balance costs and benefits; strict
liability forces the party best suited to undertake such calculus-the
defendant-to do S0.215
But utility analyses should not be the only consideration. Litiga-
tion itself presents information costs and claim costs. While informa-
tion costs decrease by moving to a strict liability standard, claims costs
increase, as strict liability leads to more suits.216 Fears about increased
claims may inhibit use of strict liability.2 7
In a related vein, strict liability may cause overdeterrence. Regard-
ing product liability, many have argued persuasively that a strict liabil-
ity standard can be unfair, especially given an ex post analysis. They
reason that strict liability can eliminate any foreseeability defenses, and
so holds individuals liable for injuries created by products that, at the
time of exposure, defendants had no idea were dangerous. 18 While
others point out that eliminating a foreseeability defense encourages re-
search on the part of defendants into the effects of their products, rigid
strict liability still seems unfair and inefficient.2 19 Therefore, fears per-
sist that generalized use of strict liability would lead to much greater
costs through overdeterrence, 2 ° even though a modified foreseeability
Tortfeasor, 20 J. Legal Stud. 363, 370-72 (1991).
Since environmental tort litigants presumably have very little control over exposure, have lit-
tle information on health risks, and cannot significantly increase these risks by their own activities,
little reason exists to force them to prove that a polluter was negligent. The fact that an analyst
with a completely different viewpoint from law and economics can arrive at the same conclusion is
interesting and, in some ways, reassuring. See Richard L. Abel, A Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L.
Rev. 785, 826 (1990) (urging use of a strict liability standard).
214. See Howard Latin, Activity Levels, Due Care, and Selective Realism in Economic
Analysis of Tort Law, 39 Rutgers L. Rev. 487, 501 (1987).
215. See Guido Calabresi and Alvin K. Klevorick, Four Tests for Liability in Torts, 14 J.
Legal Stud. 585, 614 (1985).
216. See William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law
65 (Harvard, 1987).
217. Landes and Posner agree with Shavell that important factors in selecting a liability
standard are the injurer's activity level and the injured's potential for contributory negligence. Id.
at 69. Indeed, Landes and Posner note that "[i]f a change in the defendant's but not in the plain-
tiff's activity level is an efficient method of accident avoidance, strict liability is attractive and will
be the rule chosen." Id. at 70. Since exposure to environmental pollution is usually passive, con-
tributory negligence is rare.
218. See Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 540 (N.J. 1982).
219. See Robert L. Rabin, Indeterminate Risk and Tort Reform: Comment on Calabresi and
Klevorick, 14 J. Legal Stud. 633, 638 (1985).
220. See Alan Schwartz, Products Liability, Corporate Structure, and Bankruptcy: Toxic
Substances and the Remote Risk Relationship, 14 J. Legal Stud. 689, 703-05 (1985). Schwartz
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defense theoretically could answer some of these concerns.221
Nonetheless, in most environmental tort cases, courts have adhered
to a strict liability standard.222 This may result less from a theoretical
consideration of strict liability's benefits than from an assumption that
environmental toxins should be considered abnormally dangerous and
cites the analysis by John E. Calfee and Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Com-
pliance with Legal Standards, 70 Va. L. Rev. 965 (1984). Calabresi and Klevorick respond that
decisions to undertake research would likely be fairly stochastic. Overdeterrence situations would
cancel out those in which the investigation of hazards associated with a product is minimal (un-
derdeterrence). Perhaps more to the point, answering any of these questions without decent empir-
ical information is difficult, as Calabresi and Klevorick allow. See Calabresi and Klevorick, 14 J.
Legal Stud. at 626-27 (cited in note 215).
221. With the growing awareness that environmental pollutants may be hazardous to one's
health, defendants' claims that they could not foresee health injuries should fade. Both producers
and plaintiffs are now instructed by the many examples of seemingly innocuous materials that led
to multiple, significant injuries. See generally Brennan, Toxic Torts at 41-43 (discussing a variety
of mass torts). Moreover, if one dates this awareness from the 1970s, we are now approaching a
time when the latency period for any disease reaches back only to a point when we were aware of
the potential threats represented by chemicals and other products. Therefore, the foreseeability
defense in the strict liability actions should fade over the next decade.
Also, as litigants become aware of exposure, they may begin to sue for medical monitoring,
rather than waiting for a latency period to elapse. See text accompanying notes 225-44. Remedies
fashioned concurrently with exposure raise less concern about the unfairness of ex post strict lia-
bility standards. In these cases, defendants are unable to argue that courts are unfairly holding
them liable for damages that were not foreseeable. Therefore, in cases that impose strict liability
on an ex post basis, it may be wise to adopt a knowledge defense for now, while realizing that the
defense has limited value in environmental tort litigation and that over the course of the next
decade, the case for it will become much weaker.
One other important issue is the role of insurance in a strict liability, as opposed to negligence,
regime. Schwartz has suggested that the move to strict liability has evaporated the availability of
insurance, forcing many to self-insure. See Gary Schwartz, The Ethics and the Economics of Tort
Liability Insurance, 75 Cornell L. Rev. 313, 316 (1990). Schwartz cites Priest's estimate that self-
insurance financed 60% of all product liability payoffs. See George L. Priest, The Anti Trust Suits
and the Public Understanding of Insurance, 63 Tulane L. Rev. 999, 1009 (1989).
Schwartz proceeds to argue that self-insurance should induce producers to undertake more
aggressive risk management. Since environmental liability insurance is unavailable, see Kenneth S.
Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 942, 952-54
(1988), this may indicate that insurers have decided that gradual releases of pollution are so within
defendant's control as "to render inadvisable a regime of insurance." See Schwartz, 75 Cornell L.
Rev. at 344. In this regard, the theory that strict liability forces producers who are best able to
respond to deterrence signals to do so, integrates neatly with the unavailability of insurance. See
Komesar, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 40 (cited in note 10).
222. See, for example, Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Tenn. 1986)
(holding chemical corporation strictly liable to neighbors for personal injuries and property dam-
age caused by corporation's inherently and abnormally dangerous activities in operating a hazard-
ous waste dump), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988); State
Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Ventron Corp., 468 A.2d 150 (N.J. 1983) (holding landowner strictly
liable for harm caused by toxic wastes stored on his property that flow onto the property of
others). But see Sprankle v. Bower Ammonia & Chem. Co., 824 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding
no strict liability in a case involving exposure of a factory worker to anhydrous ammonia stored in
defendant's factory and used as part of its regular manufacturing activities).
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thus "worthy" of strict liability.22
The use of strict liability does encourage claims and helps to ex-
plain the emergence of environmental torts. Strict liability is thus cen-
tral to the positive theory. As with regulatory compliance, it is difficult
theoretically to anticipate the effect on the underdeterrence-overdeter-
rence calculus induced by strict liability.
C. Accommodating Causal Evidence
1. Probabilistic Causation
Liability standards must be integrated with causation rules to de-
velop a rational approach to tort litigation.224 Specification of causal
standards is as, if not more, important than identification of an appro-
priate liability standard. As many have discussed, proving causation
with epidemiological and other toxicological evidence can be quite
troublesome.225 A general discussion of this subject is beyond the scope
of this Article. 226 Herein, the focus can be on the primary problem with
causation in hazardous substance litigation: the threshold set by the
more-probable-than-not standard.227 Most environmental carcinogens
223. The Restatement (Second) of Torts sets forth six factors to be considered in determin-
ing whether an activity is abnormally dangerous: 1) the existence of a high degree of risk of some
harm to the person, land, or chattels of others; 2) the likelihood that the harm that results from
the activity will be great; 3) the inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care; 4)
the extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage; 5) the inappropriateness of the
activity to the place where it is carried on; and 6) the extent to which the activity's value to the
community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 (1977).
Courts can readily find these factors applicable to the environmental torts discussed in this Article.
But see Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir.
1992) (acrylonitrile transport by railroad does not constitute abnormally dangerous activity).
224. Steven Shavell has shown that causation policies will vary depending on the liability
standard employed. See Steven Shavell, Uncertainty Over Causation and the Determination of
Civil Liability, 28 J. L. & Econ. 587, 596 (1985).
225. The list of articles dealing with causation in tort law and particularly in hazardous sub-
stance litigation is quite long. Among the most important are John Borgo, Causal Paradigms in
Tort Law, 8 J. Legal Stud. 419 (1979); Steven Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of
Liability in the Law of Torts, 9 J. Legal Stud. 463 (1980); Daniel A. Farber, Toxic Causation, 71
Minn. L. Rev. 1219 (1987); Mark Kelman, The Necessary Myth of Objective Causation Judg-
ments in Liberal Political Theory, 63 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 579 (1987); David Rosenberg, The Causal
Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 Harv. L. Rev.
849 (1984); Shavell, 28 J. L. & Econ. 587 (cited in note 224); and John Makdisi, Proportional
Liability: A Comprehensive Rule to Apportion Tort Damages Based on Probability, 67 N.C. L.
Rev. 1063 (1989). See also Brennan, 73 Cornell L. Rev. at 480 (cited in note 34).
226. For enlightening discussions about general issues of causal concepts in the law, see
Wright, 73 Cal. L. Rev. at 1742-50 (cited in note 225) (citing Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on
Cause-In-Fact, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 60 (1956)); H.L.A. Hart and A.M. Honore, Causation in the Law
(Oxford, 1959); Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 151 (1973). For
discussion of recent controversies concerning scientific evidence of causation, see Peter Bell, Strict
Scrutiny of Scientific Evidence, Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 1014 (Jan. 10, 1992).
227. To illustrate this threshold, consider the Allen case, in which mature epidemiological
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and toxins do not have high attributable fractions. Thus, most fail to
meet the more-probable-than-not standard,228 and cannot lead to suc-
cessful tort litigation, and hence deterrence.
The threshold 50-50 probability significantly reduces some admin-
istrative costs and may minimize some error costs. 229 However, such a
threshold weakens the deterrence signal, especially in the area of envi-
ronmental tort litigation, and thus the threshold should be abandoned.
To correct the flaw in deterrence induced by a more-probable-than-not
standard, economists and others have advocated imposing liability in
proportion to the probability of causation.23 ° In an environmental case
for instance, the polluter could compensate each person according to
the probability of causation, or the attributable fraction of disease. This
represents a move away from traditional theories of causation that em-
phasize a single injured individual and a single causally-linked responsi-
ble party; its use has prompted a spirited debate about justice in tort
law.231 Some critics fear that the statistics upon which probability of
evidence indicated that exposure to radiation caused a certain percentage or proportion of all of
particular kinds of cancers. Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247 (D. Utah 1984), rev'd, 816
F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987). An example using a simplified form of that data would proceed as
follows: Suppose that in the southern half of the state of Utah, one would expect to see 100 cases
of leukemia over a five-year period. Now, since the residents have been exposed to radiation, they
experience a 50% increase in their risk of developing leukemia. Therefore, instead of 100 cases of
leukemia, one would find 150 cases. This means that 50 out of the 150 cases of leukemia are attrib-
utable to radiation exposure. The fraction of leukemia mortality attributable to the radiation expo-
sure is 33% (50/150). But since only one-third of individuals have leukemia as a result of exposure,
no one can meet the more-probable-than-not standard of causation. See generally Troyen A. Bren-
nan and Robert F. Carter, Legal and Scientific Probability of Causation of Cancer and Other
Environmental Disease in Individuals, 10 J. Health Politics, Pol. & L. 33 (1985).
Now if the exposure to radiation had caused a tripling of leukemia risk, the exposed group
would develop 300 cases of cancer. This means that 200 out of 300, or 66%, of the cases of cancer
would be attributable to exposure. For any one individual in this situation, it is more probable
than not that leukemia resulted from the exposure (66% being greater than 51%).
228. For another discussion of this problem, see Makdisi, 67 N.C. L. Rev. at 1070-71 (cited in
note 225).
229. Steven Shavell suggests that administrative costs will increase if one moves away from
the threshold standard, largely because of an increase in number of suits filed. See Shavell, 28 J. L.
& Econ. at 604 (cited in note 224). The deterrent effect hopefully would offset these administrative
costs.
230. See, for example, Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law 116-17 (Harvard,
1987).
231. See Richard A. Epstein, Causation-In Context: An Afterword, 63 Chi. Kent L. Rev.
653 (1987). Epstein's discussion of Coase provides an excellent reflection on Epstein's view of cau-
sation and tort law. Id. at 665-66. Therein, Epstein must posit that the troubling nature of the
Coase theorem is that it treats high-handedly the "traditional law/property rights" that are central
to Epstein's world view. As Richard Wright notes perspicaciously, Epstein confuses the notions of
cause with those of individual responsibility and legal right. See Richard W. Wright, Causation,
Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics, and Proof: Pruning the Bramble Bush by
Clarifying the Concepts, 73 Iowa L. Rev. 1001, 1004-05 (1988). See also Makdisi, 67 N.C. L. Rev.
at 1073 (cited in note 225). Probability of causation is said to link injury more tightly to payment
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causation is based entail error that somehow diminishes justice.232 To a
large extent, however, these concerns center on what Richard Wright
has helpfully termed "naked statistics" and not on the evidence under-
lying probabilistic causation. 3 s
Nonetheless, if carried to an extreme, use of probability of causa-
tion would challenge our fundamental assumptions about evidence and
tort causation. For example, courts could consider every individual with
lung cancer a member of a potential group of plaintiffs who could sue
all the producers of particulate-matter air pollution. A small attributa-
ble fraction of all lung cancers could be attributable to this type of air
pollution, perhaps less than one percent. If consolidation of such a large
class were possible, the case would be viable for plaintiffs and their at-
torneys. Indeed, courts potentially could conceptualize many sorts of
injuries as such mass torts, undermining common-law doctrine in a wor-
risome manner.234 Perhaps in light of this, some keen observers of tort
litigation have recommended limiting proportionate probabilistic causa-
tion.235 A threshold eliminates a good deal of the concern about the ad-
ministrative costs associated with full use of probability of causation,
in that it leads to compensation based directly on the harm caused by a defendant. Perhaps more
importantly in the area of environmental tort litigation, probability of causation brings about the
corrective justice that otherwise would not occur given the more-probable-than-not threshold.
Probability of causation firmly ties the defendant to a penalty that is equivalent to his tortious
conduct. See also Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing Risks,
37 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 439 (1990) (advocating corrective justice as a rationale for risk-based liability).
232. See, for example, Daniel Shaviro, Statistical-Probability Evidence and the Appearance
of Justice, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 530 (1989).
233. Thus, many of the debates about the evidentiary val-ue of statistics entail paradigms
regarding blue buses and drivers of convertibles. See, for example, D.H. Kaye, Apples and Or-
anges: Confidence Coefficients and the Burden of Persuasion, 73 Cornell L. Rev. 54, (1987); Neil
B. Cohen, Conceptualizing Proof and Calculating Probabilities: A Response to Professor Kaye, 73
Cornell L. Rev. 78 (1987). I have argued that these issues tend not to bear on probability of causa-
tion in epidemiology in that the latter contains no possibility of a gold-standard (eye-witness)
evaluation of what actually occurred: probabilistic evidence is all that is or could be available. See
Brennan, 73 Cornell L. Rev. at 482 (cited in note 34).
234. See generally Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the
Legal Process, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1329 (1971); Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On
Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1357 (1985).
235. For instance, Daniel Farber would limit probability of causation to those situations in
which the court could point to a most likely victim. See Farber, 71 Minn. L. Rev. at 1221 (cited in
note 225). The ALI's Reporters' Study advocates use of full compensation when the attributable
fraction is greater than 80%. See II Reporters' Study at 344-47 (cited in note 7). This sort of
symmetry provides a greater sense of justice.
The Presidential Commission on Catastrophic Nuclear Accidents takes a somewhat similar
approach. See Presidential Commission on Catastrophic Nuclear Accidents, Report to the Con-
gress, Vol. 1, 107-08 (1990). The Commission recommended paying full compensation for any can-
cer where the probability of causation exceeds 50% and a declining proportion to a probability of
causation equal to 20%. This generous, if asymmetric, approach conforms to the common-law
standard on one end, but gives plaintiffs who fail to meet the threshold a break down to the 20%
threshold. Id. at 108.
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yet allows suit by many who are exposed to environmental hazards, but
who would today fail to reach the more-probable-than-not threshold.
When modified by use of a threshold, probabilistic causation seems
especially helpful in the paradigm of a singular, concentrated risk en-
velope. The exposed population will be subject to a single epidemiologi-
cal study, which will produce the sort of data needed to calculate
attributable fractions. The product will be rational compensation, and
perhaps more importantly, equitable and efficient deterrence. Probabil-
istic causation therefore has a great deal of normative appeal. It inte-
grates statistical evidence, does away with the more-probable-than-not
barrier, and prompts more litigation that can produce potentially ra-
tional deterrence.
While widely advocated, courts have only slowly adopted probabil-
istic causation." 6 Several major settlements were based on probabilistic
notions of causation, 3 7 however, and insurance companies have begun
to consider it as a remedy in environmental suits. 238 The prospect of
probabilistic causation must, therefore, be inducing litigation. As such,
it is likely to become a major part of the positive theory of litigation.
2. Use of Medical Monitoring
The foregoing discussion of probability of causation normatively
proposed compensation based on attributable fractions in hazardous
substances cases in which there is mature epidemiological evidence.
While controversial, it is much less so than other proposals for using
probability of causation in tort law. Many have advocated compensa-
236. Both Judge Jenkins in the Allen case and Judge Weinstein in the Agent Orange litiga-
tion endorsed probabilistic causation. Allen, 588 F. Supp. at 358-70; Agent Orange, 597 F. Supp. at
787-90. But few courts have ordered it as the basis for a remedy. Arizona courts have accepted
epidemiological evidence in cases involving the deaths of uranium miners from lung cancer. See,
for example, State Compensation Fund v. Joe, 543 P.2d 790 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975). Probabilistic
evidence of causation appears to provide enough basis to force a trial on the merits, even if the
court does not ultimately grant a remedy. In Werlein v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 887 (D. Minn.
1990), the court ruled that expert testimony that TCE is a human carcinogen and is harmful to
humans at the dosage levels ingested by the plaintiffs created a disputed factual issue sufficient to
withstand a motion for summary judgment. In accord, see Backes v. Valspar Corp., 783 F.2d 77, 80
(7th Cir. 1986) (holding that evidence that children experienced an unusual concentration of ail-
ments while drinking water from wells that might have been contaminated with phenols was suffi-
cient to withstand a motion for summary judgment because there was "some grounding for a belief
that the children's symptoms . . . were due at least in part to wastes dumped by [defendant]").
The Backes court stated that a plaintiff in a toxic tort suit cannot prevail without showing a
reasonable certainty that the defendant was the cause of his ailments, but noted that "a reasona-
ble certainty is not a certainty; it is a probability." Id. at 80. See generally Brennan, 73 Cornell L.
Rev. at 471-78 (cited in note 34).
237. See note 254.
238. Personal communication with Dennis Connolly, Johnson and Higgins (July 31, 1992).
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tion for damages as a result of exposure to risk.23 9 Emphasizing the ex
ante perspective, the liability-for-risk thesis is that the defendant
should compensate an exposed population based on the probability that
some members will develop disease or injury. This approach places
greater confidence in our ability to predict risks than current scientific
information would suggest is reasonable.24 ° In many hazardous sub-
stance cases, we cannot predict outcomes well. Only after society incurs
mass injuries and scientists study exposed populations for a long period
of time does it become clear that a certain fraction of diseases was
caused by the exposure.24'
The alternative to such monitoring, as described in the previous
section, is ex post compensation of a population after injuries have oc-
curred. 4 12 In most cases, this will require study of exposed people for a
239. See, for example, Landes and Posner, Economic Structure of Tort Law at 257-69 (cited
in note 216); R. Cooter and T. Ulen, Law and Economics at 418-21 (1988); Glen 0. Robinson,
Multiple Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 Va. L. Rev. 713 (1982); Rosen-
berg, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 849 (cited in note 225).
240. See sources cited in note 55.
241. See id. at 48. Consider for example, asbestos exposure. We can now predict with some
accuracy the attributable fractions associated with exposure to high levels of asbestos. However, we
can only mathematically model risks of those exposed to lower exposures, such as those that occur
in schools, and controversy surrounds these risk calculations. See Dean H. Hashimoto, et al.,
Should Asbestos in Buildings Be Regulated on an Environmental or Occupational Basis? in Phil-
lip J. Landrigan, Homayun Kazemi, eds., The Third Wave of Asbestos Disease 609, 610-11 (N.Y.
Acad. of Sciences, 1991). On the tort side, treating risk calculations as having great merit would be
peculiar when we know, on the regulatory side, that the lack of confidence in risk assessments
drives so much regulatory failure in the environmental area.
242. The selection of an ex ante risk compensation as opposed to an ex post probabilistic
causation standard depends on its corrective justice and efficiency benefits. Regarding corrective
justice, Glen Robinson, for example, argues, with reference to Kant, that "the morality character of
a particular action is fixed by the circumstances at the time the action is taken and not by subse-
quent events." Robinson, 68 Va. L. Rev. at 789 (cited in note 239). Thus, from a common-sense,
moral point of view, the creation of risk, not some ex post calculations, should be paramount. For a
longer discussion of these issues, see Schroeder, 37 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 439 (cited in note 231). Com-
pare Kenneth W. Simons, Corrective Justice and Liability for Risk-Creation: A Comment, 38
UCLA L. Rev. 113 (1990). Even a property-rights-based analysis of corrective justice can find jus-
tice in ex ante compensation so long as courts consider the generation of risk as constituting a
wrongful invasion of a person's rights. See Alan Schwartz, Causation in Private Tort Law: A Com-
ment on Kelman, 63 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 639, 646 (1987).
On the other hand, an ex post probabilistic causation standard that uses strict liability with a
limited defense based on state of knowledge captures much the same sense of morality. Again the
court holds the defendant liable for damages occurring as a result of risk creating behavior. More-
over, if we limit the knowledge defense in environmental tort cases, this standards retains the
justice of judging a person's action based on their knowledge of the time of action.
Regarding efficiency, both approaches deal with the significant problem of underdeterrence.
However, compensation based on risk can subsequently provoke both under- and overdeterrence in
that risk calculations can be quite inaccurate, sometimes overestimating, sometimes underesti-
mating risks. While these differences may be stochastic and eventually wash out, it nonetheless
creates a good deal of unpredictability and frustrates efforts to develop reasonable insurance mech-
anisms. In addition, the ex ante approach appears to provoke significant moral hazard. See
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period of time slightly longer than the expected latency period, so that
scientists can calculate true attributable fractions. For instance, defend-
ants would not compensate a group exposed to benzene and other sol-
vents in drinking water as a result of leakage from a hazardous waste
site at the time of exposure. Instead, the court, perhaps by enlisting
private contractors, would evaluate the group on an ongoing basis. As
diseases associated with the exposure began to occur in a statistically
excess fashion, attributable fraction concepts could provide the basis
for compensation and liability.243
Some would argue that this kind of ex post compensation is "a not-
very-satisfactory alternative. 2 44 They reason that there may be too lit-
tle incentive to induce plaintiffs to bring suits, leading to underdeter-
rence, and that this kind of ex post compensation is so contrary to
traditional tort law principles "that it could not be adopted without a
profound revolution" in tort law. 245 With regard to the latter point, the
questions of what constitutes a greater revolution in tort law is debata-
ble. Those who would compensate ex ante find that liability compensa-
tion based on risk is not extraordinary. One can only conclude, however,
that their thinking on this manner likely is based on the mistaken as-
sumption that for most sorts of environmental exposure, ex ante risk
calculations are possible.246 In any situation involving a major environ-
mental exposure, even at a singular, concentrated site, it will be difficult
to predict the exact burden of disease caused by the exposure, in part
because the exposures themselves are difficult to quantify. Neverthe-
less, a possibility remains that diseases which do not manifest them-
selves immediately will eventually occur. A suit that is initiated just
after the exposure will lead to appropriate disposition for those injured
acutely. However, a larger number of individuals may be at risk for de-
veloping disease over the next five to twenty years. Immediate tort liti-
Schwartz, 14 J. Legal Stud. at 696 n.19 (cited in note 220).
243. Richard Wright, criticizing this approach, cites Papineau's observation that "partition-
ing into reference classes with associated probabilities merely identifies possibly applicable refer-
ence classes-causal generalizations." Wright, 73 Iowa L. Rev. at 1047 (cited in note 231) (citing D.
Papineau, For Science and the Social Sciences 64-65 (1978)). Wright's contention can be taken in
two ways. First, he might be saying that overspecification of logistic regression analysis can lead to
false results. Most epidemiologists would accept this charge, but would also conduct specification
tests on any epidemiological model and identify particular pertinent causes. The other charge that
Wright might be making is that one needs some causal, necessary-sufficient condition reasoning
before doing ex post causal analyses based on statistics. Indeed, if one integrates these features,
Wright is quite happy with ex post probabilistic causation. Id. at 1053. Of course, all Wright is
saying is that any factors put into a regression model must be the result of some particularistic
causal reasoning. Epidemiologists would also applaud this requirement.
244. Landes and Posner, Economic Structure of Tort Law at 265 (cited in note 216).
245. Id.
246. See note 240 and accompanying text.
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gation relying on ex ante risk calculation cannot address these latent,
unpredictable injuries.247
Ex post probabilistic causation is thus normatively attractive.
Moreover, far from being revolutionary, it can be accomplished through
existing tort law remedies entailing use of medical monitoring. 4 8 Com-
pensation for monitoring through a system of periodic examinations for
plaintiffs, recognizes that increased risk is a form of injury. However, it
confines the award to costs that flow from the specific harm that has
occurred, not from the harm that may occur in the future. Screening
and close follow-up of the exposed population can lead to early diagno-
sis and treatment of potentially fatal diseases. Thus, both public health
and fairness rationales support awarding such damages.
Some courts have balked at awarding medical monitoring damages.
In Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,4 9 the court ruled that evi-
dence concerning increased risk of cancer was overly prejudicial. In an
earlier case, Rheingold v. E.R. Squibb and Sons,25 0 a New York court
held that increased risk was not equivalent to physical injury and thus
did not constitute compensable disease. Indeed, the latter ruling high-
lights a major problem courts have with surveillance as a foim of dam-
ages. Generally, the plaintiff has no cause of action in tort unless he or
she suffers an identifiable, compensable injury.251 As William L. Prosser
and W. Page Keeton have written, "Actual loss or damage resulting to
the interests of another [is a necessary element of a negligence cause of
action]. . . The threat of future harm, not yet realized is not
enough.'25 2 As a result, judges have hesitated to provide monitoring
costs when plaintiffs have not yet suffered physical damage.
The reasonableness of surveillance damages has, however, slowly
induced courts to skirt the physical injury requirement. For instance, in
Villari v. Terminix Int'l, Inc.,53 the court ruled that while physical
damage in the form of disease was a necessary threshold for awarding
medical surveillance damages, the plaintiffs need not demonstrate
symptoms of the disease before surveillance could begin. Other courts
247. Of course, we should not underestimate the amount of time necessary to reach final
disposition of toxic tort cases. For instance, some cases arising out of the Love Canal incident, first
investigated in 1978, are only now coming to trial. See In re Love Canal Actions, 547 N.Y.S.2d 174
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989).
248. See Leslie S. Gara, Medical Surveillance Damages: Using Common Sense and the Com-
mon Law to Mitigate the Dangers Posed by Environmental Hazards, 12 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 265,
270-71 (1988).
249. 727 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1984).
250. No. 74 Civ. 3420, slip. op. at 10 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 1975).
251. See Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936, 942 (3d Cir. 1985).
252. Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts at 165 (cited in note 212).
253. 663 F. Supp. 727 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
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have been more straightforward, requiring only the potential for physi-
cal injury, not physical injury itself.25 4 These courts recognize that some
medical monitoring actually constitutes an epidemiological study
designed to provide evidence of increased risk for disease.155
Given the normative basis of medical monitoring, several restraints
on its use seem appropriate. First, courts should not use a medical nion-
itoring fund to pay plaintiffs directly, so that they can, if they like, seek
additional medical attention. 56 Direct payments to plaintiffs do not
necessarily serve the overall purpose of medical monitoring: to diagnose
and identify early illnesses for which an exposed population is at risk.
For this reason, several courts have hesitated to award medical moni-
toring damages as a form of injunctive relief without assurance that
such costs would not be more than the total payments to individual
plaintiffs.257
Second, treating medical monitoring costs as compensable damages
is not the equivalent of reimbursing individuals for fear of cancer, nor
254. See Habitants Against Landfill Toxicants v. City of New York, 15 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 20937 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 20, 1985); Merry v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 684 F.
Supp. 847 (M.D. Pa. 1988). Perhaps the leading case on this issue is Ayers v. Township of Jackson,
525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987). The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that "the cost of medical surveil-
lance is a compensable item of damages where the proofs demonstrate, through reliable expert
testimony... the relative increase in the chance of onset of disease in those exposed, and the value
of early diagnosis." Id. at 606. Medical monitoring thus provides some assurance to the exposed
population that any latent diseases will be diagnosed promptly. For a review of recent cases, see
Amy B. Blumenberg, Note, Medical Monitoring Funds: The Periodic Payment of the Future
Medical Surveillance Expenses in Toxic Exposure Litigation, 43 Hastings L. J. 661 (1992).
255. For instance, in a Hawaii heptachlor mass exposure case, the court set up a medical
monitoring fund to study the health impacts of exposure to heptachlor in cow's milk on the island
of Oahu. See In re Heptachlor Litig., Civ. Nos. 76335, 76338, Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Approval of Disbursements (Mar. 31, 1988). The foundation created to administer the monitor-
ing fund now contemplates several discrete studies. The most important of these will be a series of
case control studies in which the researchers will compare blood levels of heptachlor in lactating
mothers on Oahu with those of mothers from other states. The epidemiological studies will provide
the basis for discerning whether the exposed population has increased levels of certain diseases.
They also satisfy the early detection aspects of medical surveillance in that the researchers will
publicize any risks uncovered.
Another theme for medical monitoring might be a modification of the settlement of the DDT
exposure at Triana, Alabama. See McGovern, 53 L. & Contemp. Probs. at 65-70 (cited in note 156).
At Triana, anyone with an elevated level of DDT could receive some compensation. Additionally,
anyone with a high level of DDT and one of several listed ailments, including cancer, reproductive
problems, high blood pressure, and increased cholesterol, could receive additional compensation.
Presumably, part of the fund could have been set aside to pay for a case-control study of those
individuals with higher levels of DDT, allowing monitors to identify excess disease in the exposed
population.
256. This relief was offered in Ayers. See 525 A.2d at 607-10.
257. See, for example, Werlein v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 887, 895 (D. Minn. 1990). This
case, like several others, centers on Superfund-based medical monitoring claims. See note 175.
Courts have denied these remedies under Superfund largely because they assume the remedies are
available under state common law.
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for the pain and suffering associated with increased risk-so-called
"cancerphobia. '2 58 While some courts have appeared willing to reim-
burse individuals for the pain, discomfort, fear, anxiety, annoyance, and
emotional distress suffered as a result of exposure to potentially hazard-
ous vapors, 259 this type of reimbursement is highly variable and in-
troduces a great deal of uncertainty into hazardous substance litigation.
It contrasts sharply with medical monitoring damages: the court must
base such damages on expert testimony, including perhaps input from
court-appointed experts or science panels regarding the presence of a
substantially increased risk of disease. 60
Third, there must be some scintilla of evidence of toxic injury, or a
significant potential for such injury, before medical monitoring reme-
dies can be granted. Many scholars are concerned that widespread use
of medical monitoring could lead to a tidal wave of new cases because
any group of individuals exposed to any chemical could request specific,
periodic tests. 61 Perhaps monitoring should be limited to situations in
which a large number of people have been exposed to significant con-
centrations of one of the fifty most toxic chemicals as designated by the
ATSDR, or to situations in which some symptoms of injury already can
be demonstrated in the exposed population. Setting a threshold seems
to be a tractable issue, and will be necessary to prevent the overdeter-
rence that would come with excessively broad use of medical monitor-
ing damage awards.
Medical monitoring, then, provides a vehicle for ex post probabilis-
tic causation and obviates the need for making the sort of uneducated
guesses that must be a part of any ex ante compensation based on
risk. 2 It checks compensation until, from an epidemiological point of
258. See Paul A. Kidwell, Comment, "Cancerphobia" and Increased Risk of Developing
Cancer Due to Toxic Exposure: Will it Spread to Missouri?, 53 Mo. L. Rev. 325, 346 (1988).
259. See French v. Moore, 661 P.2d 844 (Mont. 1983) (awarding $190,000 to couple for anxi-
ety and emotional distress resulting from exposure to hydrocarbons). Whether the court's inten-
tion was to compensate for a present but subclinical injury, or was simply to use a pragmatic
method for dealing with the latency period, is not clear in this kind of case.
260. A critical issue is the threshold risk necessary to bring about medical monitoring. Risks
of greater than one in 1000 might be one option. Only at this level will a reasonably restricted
exposed group evince excess disease.
261. Medical monitoring was this Article's most controversial recommendation when I
presented a draft to ALI's General Meeting in May, 1991.
262. See Robinson, 68 Va. L. Rev. at 793 (cited in note 239). There are other alternatives for
overcoming a latency period and yet avoiding ex ante compensation of risk. For instance, Frank
Cross has recommended use of defendant-bought insurance policies for exposed individuals. Those
people who eventually develop toxic-related disease can use these policies for health expenses and
income replacement. See generally Frank B. Cross, Environmentally Induced Cancer and the
Law: Risks, Regulation and Victim Compensation (Quorum, 1989). Whether actuaries would be
able to write policies for such restricted populations with such uncertain risks is questionable. See
Troyen A. Brennan, Book Review, 30 Jurimetrics J. 511, 515 (1990).
1993]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:1
view, certain individuals have been injured demonstrably. Thus, those
who have been exposed to risks but were not injured receive no com-
pensation other than the on-going medical monitoring.8 3
Medical monitoring has other benefits as well. It keeps the defend-
ants involved and forces them to seek ways to mitigate risk during the
latency period, thus decreasing moral hazard. Medical monitoring also
creates costs, hence deterrence signals, for producers who could other-
wise, quite rationally in a market sense, discount to present values the
cost of injuries that will occur after a latency period has run.264 In sum-
mary, attributable fraction concepts of disease compensation on an ex
post basis with medical monitoring from the time of exposure until the
end of the latency period can ameliorate problems with causation in
hazardous substance litigation. 65 This combination of doctrines, more
than any other development, makes environmental tort litigation a real
possibility.
263. The defendant would likely have to set aside some set of resources in an escrow account
as compensation for diseases should they occur. This begins to raise concerns about bankruptcy
and efficiency. See Schwartz, 14 J. Legal Stud. at 705-06 (cited in note 220).
264. See Donald N. DeWees, Economic Incentives for Controlling Industrial Disease: The
Asbestos Case, 15 J. Legal Stud. 289 (1986).
265. Any use of medical monitoring and ex post probabilistic causation for hazardous sub-
stance and injuries is dependent on mass litigation techniques in which the court consolidates the
class of individuals. While most courts have viewed mass tort class actions with a jaundiced eye,
see, for example, In re Temple, 851 F.2d 1269 (11th Cir. 1988); Raye v. Medtronic Corp., 696 F.
Supp. 1273 (D. Minn. 1988), a number of prominent environmental torts have proceeded as class
actions, see, for example, Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247 (D. Utah 1984); Sterling v.
Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F. 2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988); In re Paoli, 706 F. Supp. 358 (E.D. Pa. 1988);
Jenkins v. Raymark Indust., Inc., 109 F.R.D. 269 (E.D. Tex. 1985). See also Tomas D. Rowe and
Kenneth D. Sibley, Beyond Diversity: Federal Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction, 135 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 7 (1986); David Rosenberg, Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individuals Justice by Col-
lective Means, 62 Ind. L. J. 561 (1987). Moreover, bankruptcy court provides a mandatory class
action with strong management by court-appointed trustees. See, for example, In re A.H. Robins
Co., Inc., 88 Bankr. 742 (E.D. Va. 1988).
On balance, there is reason to believe that current federal procedure will allow the kinds of
class actions necessary to bring successful environmental tort litigation, especially around sites of
concentrated singular toxic pollution. See Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Liti-
gation, 69 B.U. L. Rev. 659, 670 (1989). Moreover, both the ALI, see ALI, Complex Litigation
Project: Tentative Draft No. 2 (April 6, 1990), and the American Bar Association (ABA), see ABA
Commission on Mass Torts, Revised Final Report and Recommendations at i-iii (1989), have rec-
ommended expanding the use of class certification in collective litigation of mass torts. The details
of these proposals go beyond the scope of this Article. It suffices to say that in various parts, the
ALI and the ABA are in favor of mandatory class actions with some removal to federal courts, and
with strong sanctions and penalties, including compelled joinder to discourage class members from
opting out.
These innovations likely would make environmental torts more attractive to entrepreneurial
lawyers, although one would not expect for them alone to create a new flood of unnecessary litiga-
tion. See, for example, Gillette and Krier, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1051 (cited in note 10). Gillette
and Krier are also suspicious of risk assessment and ex ante risk in tort litigation. Id. at 1081.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Article has been to explain environmental tort
litigation and to ask whether it has social utility. The first task, the
positive theory, was compelled by the observation that environmental
tort litigation does occur, a phenomenon that was difficult to explain in
light of existing theoretical literature that suggested it would be nearly
impossible for plaintiffs to bring successful claims. If this were the case,
then attorneys could not expect reasonable economic compensation
from their efforts and we would expect to see little or no environmental
tort litigation. Thus, the phenomenon of environmental tort litigation
over exposure to toxic chemicals prompts the question: Why is it
occurring?
The answer lies in a more sophisticated understanding of environ-
mental injury and in a recognition of the evolution of certain tort doc-
trines. Most of the observers of environmental pollution tend to adhere
to a singular notion of broadly dispersed pollution to which any one
individual has a very low level exposure. Moreover, the pollution is seen
as a melange of toxins from a variety of different point sources. While
this is perhaps the most prevalent environmental pollution paradigm, it
is not the only one. As I have suggested, especially in pollution para-
digms that tend toward rather concentrated pollution from a singular
source, potential litigants may be able to identify the pollution source
as a cause of certain injuries. In these situations, attorneys may be able
to aggregate claims sufficiently that they have a reasonable expectation
of compensation for their clients and fees for themselves. This insight
helps explain why we see environmental tort litigation, and why previ-
ous assessments of plaintiffs' probabilities of success have been too
pessimistic.
Equally important, other analyses of environmental tort litigation
have not recognized the changes now occurring in tort doctrine. Modifi-
cations of statutes of limitations have removed some access barriers to
courts. Far more importantly, right-to-know statutes and regulatory ini-
tiatives like SARA have made information on specific sites accessible to
potential litigants. As a result, the knowledge gap between litigants and
producers of pollution has narrowed considerably. This greatly encour-
ages litigation.
Liability standards also have accommodated environmental tort lit-
igation. Broad use of strict liability does away with the need to prove
negligence. Courts have not used regulatory compliance defenses in en-
vironmental cases to any extent. This means that liability standards are
generally friendly to potential plaintiffs.
Finally, and most important, the combination of probabilistic cau-
sation with medical monitoring helps overcome the otherwise extraordi-
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narily daunting problems associated with causation in hazardous
substance litigation. Courts may order medical monitoring remedies,
which, in combination with probabilistic causation, render settlements
in these cases a real possibility. Therefore, the process and access barri-
ers to environmental tort litigation do not look as sturdy as some have
suggested. The positive theory of environmental tort litigation therefore
appears rather complete.
The normative theory is anything but complete. As noted, we have
extraordinarily little evidence upon which to base recommendations for
or against tort litigation in general. This is especially true in the envi-
ronmental area. While "back of the envelope" calculations about the
economic signal faced by producers of toxic pollution compared to the
amount of mortality produced by such pollutions suggests that compar-
atively little environmental tort litigation exists, this does not seem a
satisfactory basis upon which to make major policy recommendations.
On the other hand, from a public health perspective, we rarely have the
luxury of complete evidence.
There are some reasons to encourage environmental tort litigation
from a normative vantage point. Perhaps most important, an analysis of
regulatory approaches to environmental toxins suggests that the admin-
istrative state has developed inadequate deterrence mechanisms. Incre-
mental policies now in place appear to allow the persistence of exposure
to toxic substances for discrete communities. This assessment may
change, especially if Congress or the executive agencies prove less prone
to capture. The evolution of regulation does, however, leave little room
for optimism in this regard.
As such, environmental torts that are brought in particular envi-
ronmental pollution paradigms, especially those where a singular source
concentrates pollution over a discrete community, offer the prospect of
rational deterrence. Changes in common-law doctrines that allow suits
also appear to create the basis for more rational deterrence. Probabilis-
tic causation and medical monitoring will permit the development of
remedies that fit the injuries caused by pollution, creating rational de-
terrence. While the possibility remains that litigation may have no de-
terrent impact whatsoever, or may even have a negative impact by
producing overdeterrence, an evenhanded evaluation of environmental
tort doctrine suggests otherwise.
It is possible to imagine social experiments that would estimate
and characterize the deterrence produced by environmental torts. For
instance, certain states could adopt strict liability, outlaw regulatory
compliance defenses, and insist on use of medical monitoring and prob-
abilistic causation in environmental tort cases. Over time, one could as-
sess enterprise levels, morbidity and mortality from toxic pollution, and
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compensation for attributable injuries. These states could then compare
their results to statistics from states without such reforms. Social exper-
imentation on this grand scale seems, however, unlikely. 6
For now, the incidence of environmental tort litigation is simply
too low to support any empirical analysis. Instead we must rely on the
kind of conjecture that has characterized the normative theory of envi-
ronmental torts discussed here. This Article's tentative conclusion is
that more litigation, incorporating some of the caveats noted above, is
advisable from a deterrence point of view. Given the failure of regula-
tion and the theoretical benefits of common-law litigation, any other
course seems to sanction the status quo of morbidity and mortality
from environmental pollution.
266. On the other hand, courts could apply this sort of research design to natural variations
between states that courts have previously applied elsewhere. See Brennan, 36 S.L.U. L. J. at 827-
33 (cited in note 13) (discussing difficulties of obtaining useful empirical evidence in tort law).
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